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Untangling the Web of Gift-Leaseback
Jurisprudence
Robert J. Peroni*
INTRODUCTION
Attempts by taxpayers to avoid the rigors of the progres-
sive rate structure of the federal income tax are as American as
apple pie.' Using a variety of devices, taxpayers have endeav-
ored to deflect a portion of their income to favored relatives in
lower tax brackets while retaining various degrees of control
over the source of that income.2 One increasingly attractive as-
signment-of-income device involves the transfer of low-basis or
nondepreciable property used in a taxpayer's business 3 to a
* Assistant Professor of Law, Tulane University.
1. Judge Learned Hand articulated the following, often-quoted defense of
tax avoidance:
[A] transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not
lose its immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one
choose, to evade, taxation. Any one may so arrange his affairs that his
taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern
which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to
increase one's taxes.
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), ajfd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
See generally Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax
Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440 (1968) (extensive analysis of Judge Hand's opin-
ions on the issue of form and substance in the federal tax law). Although
courts repeatedly have disavowed using tax-avoidance motive as a ground for
deciding federal tax cases, much of the strained reasoning in gift-leaseback ju-
risprudence is attributable to the courts' uneasiness with the conspicuous tax-
avoidance motive underlying the transaction. See Gunn, Tax Avoidance, 76
MICH. L. REV. 733, 740-42 (1978); infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
2. For excellent general discussions of the assignment-of-income doctrine,
see Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the
P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAx L. REv. 293 (1962); Rice, Judicial Trends in Gratuitous
Assignments to Avoid Federal Income Taxes, 64 YALE LJ. 991 (1955); Soll, In-
tra-Family Assignments: Attribution and Realization of Income (pts. 1 & 2), 6
TAX L. REV. 435 & 7 TAX L REv. 61 (1951); Surrey, Assignments of Income and
Related Devices: Choice of the Taxable Person, 33 COLUM. I. REV. 791 (1933).
3. A high bracket taxpayer should consider using the gift and leaseback
of business property as a tax-savings device at the point when the annual fair
rental value of the property exceeds the taxpayer's annual depreciation and
other deductions from the property that would be shifted to the lower-bracket
donee. Accordingly, nondepreciable property and property that the taxpayer
has completely depreciated are the most attractive subjects of a gift-leaseback
arrangement. With the introduction of the accelerated cost recovery system of
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trust4 for the benefit of immediate family members, usually the
taxpayer's minor children.5 The trust is carefully designed to
comply with the grantor trust provisions of the Internal Reve-
depreciation in new § 168, enacted as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 201(a), 95 Stat. 172, 203 (codified as amended at LR.C.
§ 168 (1982)), the gift-leaseback transaction should become even more widely
used as a tax-savings device.
Although most of the gift-leaseback cases have involved transfers of real
property (such as an office building) or depreciable equipment owned by the
donor and used in his or her business, other types of business property can be
the subject of a valid gift-leaseback, such as furniture and items of decoration
located on the donor's business premises, business supplies, professional li-
braries, and patents, copyrights, and other forms of intellectual property. See
Lerner v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 290 (1978) (physician's deduction of rental pay-
ments in a gift-leaseback of medical equipment, business supplies, office fur-
nishings, and items of decoration sustained by Tax Court), acq. in result 1984-17
I.R.B. 5; Banoff, Reducing the Income Tax Burden Of Professional Persons by
Use Of Corporations, Joint Ventures, Subpartnerships and Trusts, 58 TAXES 968,
998-99 (1980); Simmons, Resisting Continuing IRS Attacks on The Use of "Gift
and Leaseback" in Tax Planning for the Professiona4 56 TAXES 195, 198 (1978);
Comment, Gift and Leaseback, Planning Perspectives in an Unlegislated Field,
63 Ky. L.J. 205, 209 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kentucky Comment]. One com-
mentator has even suggested that the donor's interest as lessee in a lease on
real property used in the donor's business can be the subject of a valid gift-
leaseback. Banoff, supra, at 998-99. If this latter arrangement is respected, the
donor-sublessee deflects income to the trust in the amount of the difference be-
tween the presumably higher current rental value of the property owed by the
donor to the sublessor trust under the terms of the leaseback and the rent paid
by the trust to the lessor under the original lease.
4. Although this Article focuses primarily on gift-leaseback transactions
in which the property is placed in trust, the gift-leaseback arrangement can be
effected without interposing a trust between the donor-lessee and the related
donee-lessor. It is much more difficult, however, for the donor to establish that
sufficient control over the property has been relinquished for the transaction to
be respected for tax purposes when a trust is not involved. See, e.g., White v.
Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951) (disallowing the rental deductions for a
gift-leaseback effected without a trust), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952); see also
Cohen, Transfers and Leasebacks to Trusts: Tax and Planning Considerations,
43 VA. L. REv. 31, 37-40 (1957) (discussing non-trust leaseback cases and con-
cluding that the rental deductions generally will be disallowed if the gift-lease-
back is effected without a trust); Comment, Gift-Leaseback Transactions: An
Unpredictable Tax-Savings Too4 53 TEm'. L.Q. 569, 571-73 (1980) (discussing
court decisions in which the gift-leaseback transaction was accomplished with-
out using a trust).
5. By redirecting income to a trust for the benefit of a lower-bracket child,
the parent can provide the child with items of support at a lower after-tax cost,
provided that such items are not considered part of the donor's legal support
obligation and the donor has not become obligated by contract (express or im-
plied) to pay the expenses. If the trust is used to satisfy the donor's contrac-
tual obligations or legal obligation of support, its income will be taxed to the
donor under I.R.C. § 677 (1982). For example, a gift-leaseback can be used by a
taxpayer to accumulate funds to pay for a child's college and graduate school
educational expenses because such expenses generally are not considered part
of the donor's support obligation. See McGaffey, College Education with Pre-
Tax Dollars, 15 INsT. ON EST. PLAN. 300, 302.4, 306 (1981).
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nue Code6 so that none of its income will be taxed to the gran-
6. LR.C. §§ 671-679 (1982). Under these provisions, all or a portion of the
income of a trust is taxed to the grantor if (1) the grantor retains a reversionary
interest in the trust corpus that will take effect within ten years of the convey-
ance of the corpus to the trust, I.R.C. § 673 (1982); (2) the grantor retains the
power to control the beneficial enjoyment of the trust corpus or income (with
certain exceptions), LR.C. § 674 (1982); (3) the grantor retains certain adminis-
trative controls exercisable primarily for personal benefit, LRC. § 675 (1982);
(4) the grantor retains the power to revoke the trust, LR.C. § 676 (1982); or (5)
the income of the trust may be used for the benefit of the grantor or the gran-
tor's spouse, I.R.C. § 677 (1982). The grantor trust provisions are complicated in
operation and any detailed discussion of them, except to the extent pertinent to
an analysis of the gift-leaseback transaction, is beyond the scope of this Article.
For comprehensive discussions of these provisions that include planning con-
siderations, see J. PESCHEL & E. SPURGEON, FEDERAL TAXATION OF TRUSTS,
GRANTORS AND BENEFICIARIES IT 4.01-.09, 5.01-.05, 6.01-.04 (1979); Ervin, Income,
Estate and Gift Tax Problems in Planning Family Trusts Under the 1954 Inter-
nal Revenue Code, 29 S. CAL. L. R.V. 1 (1955); Hundley, The Clifford Trust and
Other Grantor Trusts-From the Draftman's Viewpoin 4 S. TEX. LIJ. 16 (1958).
If the trust arrangement does not satisfy all of the grantor trust rules, the
donor-lessee will remain the owner of the trust property for federal income tax
purposes and be taxed on its income, and the court will not have to reach the
issue whether the rental deductions on the leaseback are allowable under
§ 162(a) (3). See Duffy v. United States, 487 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding
that income from the trust remained taxable to the donor-lessee under
§ 677(a) (2), but not deciding whether the rental deductions on the leaseback
were allowable under § 162(a) (3)), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974).
If the donor's rental deduction is disallowed, either because the donor re-
tained substantially the same control over the property as prior to the gift
transfer or because the transaction as a whole lacked a business purpose under
the government's integrated transaction approach, see infra notes 67-96 and ac-
companying text, the donor should be treated as the owner of the property and
should receive the depreciation and maintenance expense deductions from the
property, and the donor's rent payments should be treated, for income tax pur-
poses, as gifts to the trust. See Rev. Rul. 54-9, 1954-1 C.B. 20 (disallowing rental
deduction in a gift-leaseback transaction involving a ten-year trust, and treating
grantor-lessee as owner of the trust property and the rent payments as gifts to
the trust), modified on other grounds, Rev. Rul. 57-315, 1957-2 C.B. 624 (ruling
that the value of the right to receive the rentals during the term of the trust is a
completed gift, for federal gift tax purposes, at the time that the property is
transferred in trust); see also, e.g., Wiles v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 289, 295
(1972) (Commissioner conceding that trust's income should be reduced to the
extent that the rental payments are not deductible by the donor-lessee), affid
mem., 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974); J. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 407 (4th ed. 1982). Despite the logical
nature of this approach, there is some risk of double taxation of the rental in-
come if the grantor's rental deduction is disallowed, either because the rent
payments may be treated as taxable income to the trust or because the grantor
may be taxed on the trust's income (including the grantor's own rentpay-
ments). See, e.g., Oliver, Income Tax Aspects of Gzfts and Leasebacks of Busi-
ness Property in Trus 51 CORNELL L. Ray. 21, 41-43, 45-46 (1965); Kentucky
Comment, supra note 3, at 321-35; cf. Lerner v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 290, 296
(1978) (upholding the validity of a three-party gift-leaseback transaction with
the donor's professional corporation as lessee and allowing the corporation to
deduct the rent paid to the trust; Commissioner argued that the rent paid by
the corporation to the trust was taxable to the donor, either as a dividend from
the corporation or under the theory that the donor remained the owner of the
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tor. The taxpayer then leases back the property for continued
business use and deducts the rental payments as a business
expense under section 162(a) (3) of the Code.7 This arrange-
ment, if respected for tax purposes, transfers a portion of the
taxpayer's business income to the lower-bracket trust benefi-
ciaries 8 through the rental payments, with ownership of the
property remaining within the family unit and possession of
the property remaining with the taxpayer.9
trust for tax purposes), acq. in result 1984-17 LR.B. 5. The conservative tax
planner may want to avoid using the gift-leaseback as a planning tool because
of this risk.
7. Section 162(a) (3) of the Code provides, in pertinent part:
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business, including -
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition
to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or busi-
ness, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking
title or in which he has no equity.
I.R.C. § 162(a) (3) (1982). The regulations promulgated under § 162 concerning
the rental deduction do not discuss the deductibility of rent paid under a gift-
leaseback arrangement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-11 (1958).
8. For federal income tax purposes, a trust is treated as a separate tax-
paying entity. See I.R.C. §§ l(e), 641 (1982). The trust, however, can deduct the
amount of its income that is required to be distributed currently, or is actually
distributed, to the trust beneficiaries, see I.R.C. §§ 651, 661 (1982), and the bene-
ficiaries must include such income in their gross income for the year, see I.R.C.
§§ 652, 662 (1982). Thus, unlike a regular C corporation, the trust's income gen-
erally is taxed only once, either at the trust or beneficiary level. See generally
J. PESCHEL & E. SPURGEON, supra note 6, I 3.01-.04.
9. The actual tax savings achieved by this arrangement roughly are equal
to the net rental income from the property (rental payments less deductible ex-
penses), multiplied by the difference in the marginal tax rates of the donor and
trust beneficiaries (assuming that the income is distributed or required to be
distributed to the beneficiaries), minus any gift tax that the donor incurs on the
transfer of the property. The maximum tax savings on a gift-leaseback transac-
tion may be achieved by having the donor-lessee lease back the property on a
"net-lease" basis with the donor-lessee agreeing to pay all taxes, utilities, insur-
ance, and other operating expenses of the trust property. The donor-lessee's
payment of these expenses would be treated as an additional rental payment
by the lessee and as additional rental income to the donee-trust. Furthermore,
the donee-trust would be treated as constructively paying these expenses and
would be entitled to deduct the expenses if they are otherwise deductible. See,
e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-8(c) (1957); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-11(a) (1958); see also G. ROBINSON, FED-
ERAL INcOME TAXATION OF REAL ESTATE 4.05 (3d ed. 1979). Accordingly, these
deductions, in effect, would remain with the higher-bracket donor (through an
increased rental deduction) and only the depreciation deduction would shift to
the donee. Leasing the property back on a net-lease basis should not affect the
validity of the gift-leaseback arrangement because the net lease is a commer-
cially acceptable method of renting property. See Oakes v. Commissioner, 44
T.C. 524, 530-31 (1965), nonacq. 1967-1 C.B. 3. But cf. Rosenfeld v. Commis-
sioner, 706 F.2d 1277, 1288 (2d Cir. 1983) (MacMahon, J., dissenting); Arlinghaus,
Uncertainty in Gift-Leaseback Area Continues After Tax Court's Decision in
[Vol. 68:735
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This relatively simple transaction has precipitated a vigor-
ous and persistent attack by the Internal Revenue Service' 0
and a resulting stream of confusing and conflicting court deci-
sions as to the standards to be used in testing the propriety of
the donor's rental deductions on the leaseback. The Fourth"l
and Fifth12 Circuits have followed the government's positionl3
that no rental deduction is allowable, because the gift and
leaseback, viewed as an integrated whole, have no business
purpose and lack economic reality. The Tax Court' 4 and the
May, 9 J. REAL EST. TAX. 245, 256 (1982) (suggesting that donee-lessor's pay-
ment of taxes, insurance, repair costs, and related expenses indicates the do-
nee's ownership of and control over the trust property). In theory, however,
the reasonableness of the rent paid by the donor-lessee to the trust should be
evaluated in the light of the net-lease arrangement, although courts have
largely ignored this fact. See Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.
1983) (ignoring donor-lessee's agreement to pay utility and other incidental ex-
penses, other than taxes); May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7 (1981) (same), affid,
723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984). But see Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 43 TAX CT.
MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1353, 1356 n.7 (1982) (questioning, but not deciding, whether
it was "reasonable" for the donor-lessee to pay a gross rental based on the en-
tire value of the property in the net lease situation), aft'd, 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.
1983); May, 76 T.C. at 40 (Wilbur, J., dissenting) (mentioning net basis of the
leaseback as a factor evidencing the unreasonableness of the rental).
10. The Internal Revenue Service designated the gift-leaseback transaction
in which the grantor-lessee retains a reversionary interest in the property a
"prime issue" in 1973. National Office List of Prime Issues, 737 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. T 6527 (Jan. 1, 1973). Prime issues are those that the Service ordinarily
will litigate and not settle by closing agreement or compromise. Accordingly,
the tax adviser must approach the area with caution and should warn the client
that litigation is possible. Cf. Simmons, New Developments in the "Gift and
Leaseback" in Tax Planning for the Professional, 51 TAXES 654, 658 (1973) (ad-
vising counsel not to plan their clients into litigation and suggesting that no re-
version be retained by the donor and that the lease terms by negotiated with
an independent trustee after the transfer by gift).
11. See Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1052 (1976).
12. See Mathews v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 967 (1976); Wiles v. Commissioner, 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974), affig
mem. 59 T.C. 289 (1972); Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970);
Chace v. United States, 422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970), affig per curiam 303 F.
Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969); Furman v. Commissioner, 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967),
affg per curiam 45 T.C. 360 (1966); Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965). The new Eleventh Circuit presuma-
bly will treat these decisions of the old Fifth Circuit as binding precedent, un-
less they are overruled by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc. See Bonner v.
City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that Fifth Circuit
decisions handed down on or before September 30, 1981, are binding as prece-
dent in the Eleventh Circuit).
13. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 54-9, 1954-1 C.B. 20, modified on other grounds, Rev.
Rul. 57-315, 1957-2 C.B. 624,323 IRS LETrER RULINGS REP. 8318079 (CCH) (Feb. 2,
1983).
14. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 43 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1353
(1982), affd, 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983); May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7 (1981),
aff'd 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984); Lerner v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 290 (1978),
1984]
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Second,'5 Third,16 Seventh,17 Eighth,18 and Ninth19 Circuits
have allowed the taxpayer to deduct the rentals on the lease-
back, but without developing any consistent theoretical ap-
proach for deciding the issue.
Courts allowing the rental deduction generally agree that
only the leaseback portion of the transaction must serve a busi-
ness purpose and then only in the sense that use of the leased
property must be necessary in the taxpayer's business. These
courts also generally agree, but with less harmony, that the
leaseback portion of the transaction must have the earmarks of
a bona fide rental transaction, that is, the leaseback "normally"
should be in writing20 and must require payment of a reason-
acq. in result 1984-17 I.R.B. 5; Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 37 TAX CT. MEM. DEC.
(CCH) 346 (1978), affid, 599 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979);
Mathews v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 12 (1973), rev'd, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976). The Tax Court continues to follow its four-part
test announced in Mathews, despite the reversal of Mathews by the Fifth Cir-
cuit, except in those cases in which the appeal would lie to the Fourth, Fifth,
and, presumably, Eleventh Circuits. Under the rule established in Golsen v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), affid, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 940 (1971), the Tax Court is bound to follow the precedent of the court
of appeals to which the appeal would lie, if that precedent is "squarely in
point." See Butler v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 327 (1975) (Tax Court following
Fifth Circuit's business-purpose test); see also Zumstein v. Commissioner, 32
TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 198 (1973) (Tax Court following Fifth Circuit
precedent).
15. See Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983). But cf.
White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951) (disallowing rental deductions
in a gift-leaseback effected without a trust), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952);
Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962) (citing White v. Fitzpat-
rick and disallowing rental deduction in a trust-leaseback).
16. See Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 814 (1950); see also Engel v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Pa. 1975)
(upholding the donor's deduction of the rental payments in a gift-leaseback
transaction involving a Clifford trust), affid mem., 562 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1977).
The affirmance by the Third Circuit in Engel was decided by an evenly divided
court sitting en banc, indicating that support for the Brown decision has been
eroded in the Third Circuit.
17. See Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
18. See Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 996 (1979).
19. See May v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984); Brooke v.
United States, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972) (only implicitly rejecting the govern-
ment's integrated transaction business-purpose test).
20. As the modifying word "normally" suggests, the requirement of a writ-
ten lease is not absolute, and there have been cases in which the rental deduc-
tion was allowed in a gift-leaseback transaction without a written lease when
the taxpayer presented sufficient other evidence to prove the existence of a
binding lease agreement. See Brooke, 468 F.2d at 1157; May v. Commissioner, 76
T.C. 7 (1981), afid, 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984). For a criticism of these courts'
rather lax application of the written lease requirement, see infra notes 119-25
and accompanying text.
Disagreement about the requirement of a written lease surfaced in the Tax
[Vol. 68:735
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able rent. The judicial consensus dissolves when the courts
consider whether the taxpayer has surrendered sufficient con-
trol over the property to warrant treating the gift portion of the
transaction as a valid transfer of ownership to the donee for
purposes of section 162(a) (3). Using an approach reminiscent
of the Supreme Court's decision in Helvering v. Clifford,2 1 the
courts have looked at several factors in deciding the control is-
sue, including whether the trustee is independent, whether the
leaseback has been prearranged, whether the initial term of the
leaseback is coextensive with the trust's duration, and whether
the grantor has retained a reversionary interest in the trust
property, but the courts have not agreed on the significance of
these factors or even why they are relevant to the deductibility
of rentals under the Internal Revenue Code. The result of this
judicial confusion is a body of incoherent case law that seems
to change with each new court decision, an absence of clear
guidelines for taxpayers and their advisers,22 and a misalloca-
Court's decision in May. Three dissenting judges viewed the absence of a writ-
ten lease in that case as a factor supporting disallowance of the rental deduc-
tion. 76 T.C. at 34 (Simpson, J., joined by Parker, J., dissenting); id. at 36-37
(Wilbur, J., joined by Parker, J., dissenting). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the Tax Court's allowance of the rental deductions on the leaseback,
without discussing the written lease issue. 723 F.2d at 1436-37.
21. 309 U.S. 331 (1940). In Clifford, the taxpayer transferred income-pro-
ducing securities to a five-year reversionary trust for the benefit of his wife,
naming himself as trustee. The taxpayer retained the right to accumulate in-
come in his "absolute discretion" and broad administrative powers over the
trust corpus. The Court held that the income from the trust corpus remained
taxable to the taxpayer because he retained dominion and control over the
trust corpus that was tantamount to ownership of the property for federal in-
come tax purposes. The uncertainty created by the Clifford case and the incon-
sistent application of the Clifford decision by lower courts was the primary
catalyst for the Treasury's issuance in 1946 of detailed regulations on the sub-
ject of grantor trusts, and ultimately, for enactment of the grantor trust rules of
the 1954 Code. See 3 B. BrrrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GFrs 80.1.1 (1981); Ervin, supra note 6, at 2-3.
22. This continuing uncertainty has led a number of commentators to give
only very tentative approval to the arrangement as a planning device. See, e.g.,
Elder, Gifts and Leasebacks: The Current Scene, 11 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1 1400,
1405 (1977); Peschel, New Developments in Estate Planning, 28 MAJOR TAX
PLAN. 1, 7-8 (1976); Comment, Intrafamily Trust Leasebacks: A Fifth Circuit
Perspective, 11 Ctm. L. REV. 47, 72-73 (1980); Comment, The Deductibility of
Rentals in the Context of Gifts and Leasebacks of Income-Producing Property
in Trust, 47 TENN. L. REV. 601, 627-30 (1980).
Because reasonable certainty of tax consequences is very important to the
planner, any solution to the gift-leaseback controversy must take into account
this need for certainty. As four prominent scholars stated in the context of a
discussion of the American Law Institute's proposal that influenced the formu-
lation of the grantor trust rules of the 1954 Code:
The family property planners ... have also realized that the prime re-
quirement for their planning is that of tax certainty. As long as the pol-
1984]
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tion of judicial and administrative resources to the inevitable
litigation that such confusion engenders. To date, the Supreme
Court and Congress have refused to resolve this judicial
quagmire.
Although the gift-leaseback transaction has generated a
flood of legal commentary,23 the issue remains a worthy target
for criticism and analysis. This Article suggests that the courts
have failed to resolve satisfactorily the gift-leaseback issue be-
cause they have unduly emphasized the tax-avoidance motive
underlying the transaction and other similarly misplaced con-
cerns, and because they have not properly recognized the doc-
trinal relationship between the deduction of rent under section
162(a) (3) in a gift-leaseback transaction and the grantor trust
rules developed for gifts to trusts, 2 4 the statutory rules for as-
signing income through a family partnership,25 and the more
icy line is chartered within the general area of acceptable policy
compromise, it is relatively unimportant that here and there the pre-
cise location of the line may have produced a sharp but limited disa-
greement. Much more important than the terms of the resolution of
that disagreement is the fact that the disagreement has been resolved
and a definite tax answer provided. The family property planner thus
knows for certain the tax price tag attached to each of his techniques.
He is not forced to plan today and then find out years later which tax
price tag the administrator or the judge decides to place on the tech-
nique utilized. Moreover, many of the family property planners allow
an appreciable margin to exist between their course and the dividing
line. They are therefore usually untroubled by the slight bends in that
line thought necessary by the Treasury to catch the tax avoider who
charts his course as close to the line as possible.
Holland, Kennedy, Surrey & Warren, A Proposed Revision of the Federal In-
come Tax Treatment of Trusts and Estates-American Law Institute Draft, 53
COLUM L. REV. 316, 360 (1953).
23. See, e.g., Friedlander, Gift-Leaseback: The IRS' Misguided Campaign,
19 CAL. W.L. REV. 288 (1983); Froehlich, Clifford Trusts: Use of Partnership In-
terests as Corpus; Leaseback Arrangements, 52 CAuiJ. L. REV. 956 (1964); Price,
"Eat, Drink and Be Merry" at the Expense of the Federal Fisc, 49 TAXES 175
(1971); Shurtz & Harmelink, Trust-Leasebacks After Quinlivan, 16 CAl, W..
REV. 1 (1980); Note, Clifford Trusts: A New View Towards Leaseback Deduc-
tions, 43 ALB. L. REV. 585 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Albany Note]; Note, Gifts
and Leasebacks: Is Judicial Consensus Impossible?, 49 U. CiN. L REV. 379
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Cincinnati Note]; Note, Tax Consequences of an In-
trafamily Transfer of Business Property into Trust for Dependents with a Lease-
back by the Grantor's Business, 73 CoLuM. L. REv. 1420 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Columbia Note]; Note, Gift and Leaseback-Tax Planning in the Shadows of
Assignment of Income and Business Purpose, 62 GEo. L.J. 209 (1973); Note,
Finding the Key to the Deductibility of Rental Payments Under a Gift and
Leaseback 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 767 (1979).
24. As noted earlier, the grantor trust rules are contained in I.R.C. §§ 671-
679 (1982).
25. See I.R.C. § 704(e) (1982). Subject to certain limitations, § 704(e) al-
lows an owner of a business in which capital is a material income-producing
factor to deflect a portion of the business income to a lower-bracket family
member by giving that family member a partnership interest in the business.
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general judge-made rules for assigning income through trans-
fers of income-producing property.2 6 The courts also have mis-
read congressional intent concerning the gift-leaseback issue
and have misapplied the amorphous substance-over-form, busi-
ness-purpose, and step-transaction doctrines. 2 7 That the gift-
leaseback transaction remains controversial is evidenced by
the five different opinions in the Tax Court's 1981 decision in
May v. Commissioner2 8 and by the Second Circuit's 1983 deci-
sion in Rosenfeld v. Commissioner,2 9 which upheld the validity
of the gift-leaseback transaction but with a vigorous dissenting
opinion that criticized the generally favorable treatment ac-
corded the gift-leaseback transaction in the recent case law.
This Article first considers the sources of confusion in the
gift-leaseback controversy. It then analyzes the various ap-
proaches that the government and the courts have used to re-
solve the problem, indicating the inconsistencies in reasoning
that characterize these approaches. Finally, this Article
presents a suggested approach for deciding the validity of the
rental deduction in a gift-leaseback transaction and concludes
Id. For this income-splitting device to be effective, the donor must transfer
ownership of, and dominion and control over, the donated partnership interest
to the donee. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(e) (1) (iii), -1(e) (2) (1956). See generally 1
W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WmITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS
AND PARTNERS ch. 14 (1977) (extensive discussion of family partnerships); 3 A.
WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEwAIrE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION pt. 17 (3d ed.
1981) (same).
26. Under the principles developed in the Supreme Court's decisions in
Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937), Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940),
Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941), and their progeny, to effectively as-
sign income from property to a lower-bracket donee, the higher-bracket donor
must transfer to the donee an interest in the property coextensive in time with
the interest the donor owns. If the assigned interest is for a shorter duration
than the donor's interest but is for a period of at least ten years, it remains un-
clear whether the assignment will be effective by analogy to the ten-year cutoff
in I.R.C. § 673 (1982). See Rev. Rul. 55-38, 1955-1 C.B. 389 (ruling that a lifetime
income beneficiary of a testamentary trust who irrevocably assigned a certain
portion of the trust income for a period of at least ten years had made an effec-
tive assignment of income to the donee, and treating the assignment as a dispo-
sition of a "substantial interest in the trust property" by analogy to the ten-
year cutoff in the Clifford trust regulations of the 1939 Code). Of course, under
the doctrine of Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), and its progeny, the do-
nor also must surrender effective control over the transferred property interest
to the donee to avoid taxation on the income from that interest. For an exten-
sive discussion of these principles, see Lyon & Eustice, supra note 2.
27. See infra notes 67-96 and accompanying text.
28. 76 T.C. 7 (1981), affd, 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984). The Tax Court is-
sued one concurring opinion and three dissenting opinions in the May case.
29. 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983). United States District Judge MacMahon,
sitting by designation, wrote the dis., enting opinion in the Rosenfeld case. Id.
at 1283-88.
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with some recommendations for structuring the gift-leaseback
transaction.
I. SOURCES OF CONFUSION
A. SPURIOUS CONCERNS OF THE COURTS AND THE GOVERNMENT
The confusion surrounding the gift-leaseback case law can
best be understood by first identifying what about the transac-
tion so concerns the government and the courts. Only by dem-
onstrating the irrelevance or misplaced emphasis of these
concerns in resolving the gift-leaseback controversy can a more
logical approach be developed.
First and foremost among these concerns is the obvious
tax-avoidance motive underlying the transaction. Although
courts have often stated that a tax-avoidance motive is not to
be held against the taxpayer,30 they clearly are uncomfortable
with upholding tax-motivated transactions and will strain their
interpretation of statutory language, legislative history, and
case precedent to strike down perceived tax-avoidance devices.
In the gift-leaseback area, this concern with tax-avoidance mo-
tive is evident in those decisions adopting the government's
questionable business-purpose test. These courts have used
the amorphous judge-made doctrines of "business purpose,"
"step transaction," and "substance over form" to rationalize
disallowing the rental deduction, but plainly their real message
is that tax avoidance, particularly through the reallocation of
income within the family unit, is an unacceptable objective in
structuring one's affairs.31 Even some courts upholding the de-
duction have exhibited their undue concern with the tax-avoid-
30. In Gregory v. Helvering, the case in which the Supreme Court first
enunciated its amorphous business-purpose doctrine, the Court stated:
The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise
would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law
permits, cannot be doubted. But the question for determination is
whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing
which the statute intended.
293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (citations omitted). The supposed neutrality of tax-
avoidance purpose in deciding federal tax cases has been extensively analyzed
elsewhere. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 1; R. PAuL, Restatement of the
Law of Tax Avoidance, in STUDIES m FEDERAL TAxATIoN 9 (1st series 1937);
Angell, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance, 38 COLum. L REV. 80 (1938); Blum,
Motive, Inten4 and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U. CHLI L REV. 485
(1967); Cahn, Taxation: Some Reflections on the Quest of Substance, 30 GEO.
LJ. 587 (1942); Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation of
Private Law to the Law of Taxation, 37 TuL. L. REV. 355 (1963); Rice, Judicial
Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 MCH. L REV. 1021 (1953).
31. For example, in Van Zandt v. Commissioner, the first appellate deci-
sion to adopt the government's business-purpose test in the context of a gift-
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ance aura of the transaction by searching for elusive nontax
purposes for the arrangement. 32
The concern with tax-avoidance motive evidences the gov-
ernment's and the courts' misunderstanding of the nature of
the issue involved in the gift-leaseback controversy. The issue
in the gift-leaseback cases is not why the transaction was un-
dertaken-clearly, as in most assignment-of-income cases, it
was primarily for tax-avoidance purposes-but rather what the
transaction accomplished.33 In other words, the issue is
leaseback transaction effected with a trust, the court indicated its view of the
role of tax-avoidance motive in deciding the gift-leaseback cases:
However, in determining whether the Tax Court correctly held that
these deductions could not be recognized, the fact that it has a salutary
effect for the taxpayer is not of prime consideration. There is no princi-
ple of law that has been more clearly established than that a taxpayer
may avail himself of all provisions established by the statutes for mini-
mizing his taxes. The effect, however, does become of some signifi-
cance when, as viewed by the Tax Court, and as we must view it, a
payment between two closely related individuals can be explained only
because of the salutary effect it has on the affairs of one of the two par-
ties.
.h us viewing it, we conclude that the obligation to pay rent re-
sulted not as an ordinary and necessary incident in the conduct of the
business, but was in fact created solely for the purpose of permitting a
division of the taxpayer's income tax.
341 F.2d at 441-42, 443 (emphasis in original). Thus, although the Fifth Circuit
disavowed any concern with the taxpayer's desire to save taxes, the tax-avoid-
ance purpose for initiating the gift-leaseback transaction was in fact the pri-
mary rationale for the court's decision to disallow the rental deduction. See
also Mathews, 520 F.2d at 324-25; Perry, 520 F.2d at 238; Gunn, supra note 1, at
742 n.34.
32. For example, in Brooke v. United States, the majority strained to find
nontax purposes for the transaction, without explaining the relevancy of such
nontax motives to either determining the sufficiency of the property interest
transferred, the test seemingly adopted by the majority, or determining
whether there was a business purpose for the transaction viewed as an inte-
grated whole, the test advanced by the government and accepted by the dis-
senting judge. The nontax motives that the court recognized were avoidance of
friction within the medical practice, insulation of the property from liability,
and diminished ethical conflict arising from the ownership of a medical practice
with an adjoining pharmacy. 468 F.2d at 1158; see also Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d at
1282 (describing the taxpayer's desire to guarantee his children's financial well-
being as a "legitimate non-tax motive" for the creation of the trust and lease-
back); cf. May, 723 F.2d at 1437 (emphasizing that the purpose of the trust
transfer was "to provide for the health, care and educational needs of the tax-
payers' children" in concluding that the gift-leaseback transaction was not a
"sham or a fraud"). As one commentator has aptly noted, if such self-serving
assertions of nontax motives are treated as satisfying the government's busi-
ness-purpose test, the test is rendered "largely useless." Friediander, supra
note 23, at 297-98 & n.57.
33. In Stearns Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, the corporate taxpayer
distributed a patent to its two shareholders as a dividend and then entered into
a nonexclusive licensing agreement with the shareholders to sell the patented
device. The issue was whether the royalties paid by the corporation to the
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whether the donor surrendered sufficient control over the prop-
erty to the donee-trust to permit the latter to be treated as the
owner of the property for purposes of section 162(a) (3). The
court's basic task in deciding that issue is the same as in any
case involving an attempted assignment of income from prop-
erty with which the donor has not completely severed his or
her relationship--drawing the line between those retained con-
trols that require the property's income still to be taxed to the
donor and those that permit the tax to be shifted to the donee.
The taxpayer's tax-avoidance motive for entering into the
transaction has little relevance in that determination.
Furthermore, using a tax-avoidance motive as a basis for
deciding federal tax cases is particularly inappropriate when
Congress has sanctioned a particular tax-minimization device,
as it has by enacting the grantor trust rules to govern the taxa-
tion of the Clifford trust.34 As the Eighth Circuit in Quinlivan
and the Second Circuit in the Rosenfeld case recognized, 35 the
real question in such a situation is whether the transaction
falls within the approved class of tax-minimization devices.
The other courts' refusal to use this approach, by relying on an
ambiguous and inconclusive piece of legislative history dis-
shareholders under the licensing agreement were deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses under the statutory predecessor to § 162 of the
1954 Code. In upholding the corporation's deduction of the royalties, the court
aptly stated: "If the parties deal fairly with one another, it matters not whether
their aim be. . . 'to avoid taxes or to regenerate the world."' 208 F.2d 849, 852
(7th Cir. 1954) (quoting Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 296 U.S. 641 (1935)).
34. A Clifford trust, which takes its name from Helvering v. Clifford, 309
U.S. 331 (1940), is a grantor trust whereby the grantor retains the right to pos-
sess again the property transferred in trust on the occurrence of some event,
such as the beneficiary's death or the expiration of a period of time. Unless the
requirements of I.R.C. § 673 (1982) are satisfied, the income will be taxed to the
grantor rather than to the trust and its beneficiaries.
35. In Quinlivan, the Eighth Circuit considered § 162(a) (3) and §§ 671-678
(the grantor trust rules) in pari materia and concluded that the gift-leaseback
device was sufficiently similar to the Clifford trust that it too should be viewed
as a congressionally-sanctioned tax minimization device. 599 F.2d at 273-74.
Likewise, the Second Circuit in Rosenfeld concluded that Congress, in enacting
the grantor trust rules, had made a policy judgment to sanction the use of Clif-
ford trusts as tax-avoidance devices and that the government's proposed busi-
ness-purpose test in the gift-leaseback area was inconsistent with that policy
judgment. 706 F.2d at 1281-82; see also Engel v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 5, 6
(W.D. Pa. 1975) (rejecting the government's integrated transaction business-
purpose test, stating that "[a]ny reduction of the plaintiffs' taxes which re-
sulted from this packaged business arrangement has been sanctioned by Con-
gress in Sections 671-678 ... which allow creation of Clifford trusts as income-
splitting devices"), affd mem, 562 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1977); cf. Lerner v. Commis-
sioner, 71 T.C. 290, 301-02 (1978) (transaction valid because taxpayer did not vio-
late any of the restrictions in §§ 673-677), acq. in result 1984-17 I.R.B. 5.
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cussed later in this Article, may evidence their displeasure
with the lines Congress has drawn in the grantor trust rules
and their preference for the more flexible, common law ap-
proach of Helvering v. Clifford.36 The uncertainty engendered
by the Clifford approach, however, led Congress to draw rea-
sonably certain boundaries in the grantor trust area and thus to
sanction ten-year trusts as tax-avoidance devices.37 It is not
within the province of the courts to ignore that legislative
determination.
A second concern expressed by the government and some
courts38 is with the voluntariness of the rental obligation-that
is, since the taxpayer voluntarily created the need for the
rental obligation by giving the property away, the rental pay-
ments were not "required to be made as a condition to the con-
tinued use or possession" of the property and consequently
should not be deductible under section 162(a) (3). This concern
may simply reiterate the concern with the tax-avoidance mo-
tive underlying the transaction. If so, it has little relevance in
analyzing the gift-leaseback transaction for the reasons stated
above.
On the other hand, if the concern with the voluntary nature
of the transaction actually means that a rental expense is not
deductible if the taxpayer voluntarily created the situation ne-
cessitating the rental, the government and those courts con-
cerned with voluntariness are adding a requirement to the
rental deduction that plainly is not in the statute. Nothing in
the tax law requires a taxpayer to retain ownership of existing
property rather than dispose of the existing property and rent
36. 309 U.S. 331 (1940); see also supra note 21 (discussion of Clifford).
Under § 671, enacted in 1954, the grantor of a trust shall not be taxed on trust
income "solely on the grounds of his dominion and control over the trust under
section 61 (relating to definition of gross income) or any other provision of this
title, except as specified" in the grantor trust rules. LR.C. § 671 (1982); see H.R.
REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A212, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4017, 4351-52; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 365, reprinted in 1954
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 5006.
37. Cf. Edward L. Stephenson Trust v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 283, 290-92
(1983) (treating grantor's two trusts as separate taxable entities, despite the
grantor's tax-avoidance purpose in setting up the multiple trusts, and holding
Treas. Reg. § 1.641 (a)-0(c) (1972) invalid); Estelle Morris Trusts v. Commis-
sioner, 51 T.C. 20, 39 (1968) (stating that since the Revenue Act of 1916, "the tax
laws have recognized implicity that trusts may be used as income splitting de-
vices"), affd per curiam, 427 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1970). For a discussion of the
use of Clifford trusts as tax-saving devices, see Yohlin, The Short-Term Trust-A
Respectable Tax-Saving Device, 14 TAX I- REV. 109 (1958).
38. See, e.g., Perry, 520 F.2d at 238; Van Zandt, 341 F.2d at 442-43; Skemp, 8
T.C. at 421.
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replacement property. If that were the law, a rental deduction
would never be allowed when the taxpayer decided to sell or
give away existing property and rent replacement property
from a third party. Since no court would disallow the rental de-
duction in these latter situations, courts should not disallow
the rental deduction in a gift-leaseback merely because the
rent dollars go to a trust for the benefit of the lessee's family
members rather than to some third party.39 As some courts
properly have recognized, the issue is not whether the taxpayer
voluntarily created the situation, but rather whether the tax-
payer relinquished sufficient control over the property to re-
quire leasing the property back to retain possession. 40 In other
words, has an actual obligation to pay rent been created? The
taxpayer's volition in creating the rental obligation is another
red herring which courts should ignore in deciding gift-lease-
back cases.
A third concern of the government and the courts is the po-
tential for abuse inherent in a transaction between related tax-
payers, whether that transaction is structured as a sale, a lease,
or some other arrangement. Although this concern has some
validity,41 the familial relationship between lessor and lessee in
a gift-leaseback should not mean that the rental deduction is
per se invalid or that it must satisfy any special business-pur-
39. See Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d at 1282-83; Quinlivan, 599 F.2d at 274 n.5; Engel
v. United States, 400 F.Supp. 5, 5-6 (W.D. Pa. 1975) ("Had the trustee of the
property conveyed by plaintiff to the Clifford trust rented out this property to a
third-party while the plaintiff rented similar premises on the open market for
the same rent, the tax consequences would be the same as the result here if
the plaintiffs deduction is upheld."), affd mer., 562 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1977); see
also Friedlander, supra note 23, at 296, 298. But see Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d at 1286
(MacMahon, J., dissenting).
40. See Broum, 180 F.2d at 929-30; Skemp, 168 F.2d 598.
41. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 746 (1949); Commis-
sioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 291 (1946). One commentator has aptly described
the tendency of courts to approach business transactions between members of
a family with suspicion:
If the deduction reduces the tax liability of the payor more than it in-
creases the liability of the recipient.., the courts scrutinize the un-
derlying transaction closely, demanding proof that its terms are
equivalent to an arm's length bargain and that it serves a purpose
other than tax avoidance. Whether the language of "presumption" is
used or not, their working hypothesis is that transactions with outsid-
ers have a built-in guarantee of good faith and business purpose, but
that intrafamily transactions are less likely to be what they purport to
be. The ultimate source of this doubt is, of course, a judicial view of
social behavior, not an explicit statutory direction to the courts.
Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. Ray. 1389, 1458
(1975).
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pose test.42 It means only that the court must scrutinize care-
fully the parties' allocation of the benefits, burdens, and risks of
the ownership of the property after the leaseback transaction
to determine whether that allocation is consistent with tradi-
tional business dealings between lessors and lessees and with
the assignment-of-income rules. To be sure, Congress has on
occasion decided to disallow entirely deductions of losses or
expenses resulting from transactions between related persons
when there is great potential for abuse and significant difficulty
in determining whether the loss or expense is bona fide. 43 Con-
gress likewise could adopt a per se disallowance rule in the
gift-leaseback area. But it has not yet done so, and it is not
within the province of the courts to adopt standards equivalent
to a per se disallowance of the deduction.44
Some courts have hinted at a fourth concern, that allowing
a rental deduction in a gift-leaseback transaction would violate
the basic tax policy principle of equity. Apparently, these
courts believe that since only taxpayers in high-income brack-
ets benefit from this assignment-of-income device, allowing the
42. An example of some courts' failure to recognize the distinction be-
tween approaching intrafamily transactions with a watchful eye and automati-
cally assuming that such transactions can never be bona fide because of the
lack of arm's length bargaining is the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Mathews:
"[Tihe fact rent negotiations produced 'reasonable' results is totally irrelevant.
Any bargaining is simply not at arm's length, because any rent exceeding ex-
penses stays in the Mathews family." 520 F.2d at 325. Given the Fifth Circuit's
confusion about this distinction, it is not surprising that it has adopted the gov-
ernment's questionable business-purpose test.
43. See, e.g., LR.C. § 267(a) (1) (1982) (disallowing the deduction of losses
on sales and exchanges of property between specified related persons); LR.C.
§ 267(a) (2) (1982) (disallowing the deduction of expenses and interest owed by
a taxpayer to a related person if the payor uses the accrual method of tax ac-
counting and the related payee uses the cash method of tax accounting, unless
the debt is paid within two-and-one-half months after the close of the payor's
taxable year). See generally Hertz, Dealing with Related Persons: Salaries and
Other Compensation; Sales of Property; Interest Accruals and Other Deduc-
tions, 23 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 577 (1965) (discussion of unfavorable tax treat-
ment accorded to transactions between related parties). For a critique of the
congressional prohibition of deductions based solely on familial relationships,
see Bittker, supra note 41, at 1462-63. But cf. Reilly, An Approach to the Simpli-
fication and Standardization of the Concepts "The Family," "Related Parties,"
"Control," and "Attribution of Ownership," 15 TAx L REv. 253, 262-63 (1960)
(broad application of the disallowance provisions based on familial relation-
ships necessary to prevent tax avoidance in transactions controlled by closely
related economic units).
44. Professors Lyon and Eustice have criticized the government for seek-
ing disallowance of the rental deduction in a gift-leaseback through litigation,
rather than by asking Congress to draft legislation prohibiting the deduction
analogous to the rules in § 267 of the Code. Lyon & Eustice, supra note 2, at
340; see also White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398, 402 (2d Cir. 1951) (Chase, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952).
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rental deduction violates vertical equity principles 45 because it
undermines the intended degree of progressivity in the federal
income tax system. 46 Under this view, the rental deduction in a
gift-leaseback would never be proper, however carefully the
parties structured the transaction.
This argument, however, demonstrates a misunderstanding
of the function of the vertical equity criterion. Since the pur-
pose of all assignment-of-income devices, including those in-
volving transfers of income-producing property, is to mitigate
the effects of the progressive rate structure, it is difficult to see
how the vertical equity criterion can assist in distinguishing be-
tween deflection devices that will be respected for tax purposes
and those that will not. In this area, the vertical equity crite-
rion must yield to considerations of administrative practical-
ity 4V-at some point, the donor will have transferred sufficient
control over the property to the donee to warrant taxing the do-
nee on the property's income and treating the donee as the
owner of the property for purposes of the assignment-of-in-
come doctrine and section 162(a) (3), despite the possible detri-
mental effect of the transaction on the vertical equity of the tax
system.
In addition, the argument ignores the possible tax policy
objectives furthered by permitting a rental deduction in a gift-
leaseback transaction. Horizontal equity-another basic tax
policy principle-requires that taxpayers in equal economic cir-
cumstances receive equivalent tax treatment.48 Since a busi-
ness taxpayer who pays rent to a third party for business
45. Vertical equity dictates that there be appropriate differentiations be-
tween taxpayers on each income level and those on the income levels above
and below. What constitutes an "appropriate differentiation" depends on the
theorist's views of the merits of a progressive tax system. See 1 B. BrrrKER,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs $ 3.1.4, at 3-10 to 3-11 (1981).
See generally Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. I
REv. 567, 581-86 (1965) (discussion of vertical equity criterion).
46. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d at 1286 (MacMahon, J., dissenting); Ma-
thews, 520 F.2d at 324; Brooke, 468 F.2d at 1161 (Ely, J., dissenting); Columbia
Note, supra note 23, at 1448-49.
47. See generally Gunn, supra note 1, at 760-65.
48. See 1 B. BrrrsxR, supra note 45, 3.1.4, at 3-11 to 3-12; Sneed, supra
note 45, at 579. For a different horizontal equity argument regarding allowance
of the rental deduction in a gift-leaseback transaction, see Columbia Note,
supra note 23, at 1444-45.
One commentator has forcefully argued that allowance of the rental deduc-
tion in a gift-leaseback transaction violates horizontal equity principles if the
income of the trust is used for the benefit of close relatives of the donor-lessee.
Id. at 1447-48. Under this view, the donor and the trust beneficiaries are viewed
as one economic unit for tax purposes.
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property only pays tax on the business income net of the rental
expense, a similarly-situated taxpayer who pays the same
rental expense to a trust in a gift-leaseback should also be al-
lowed a deduction, provided the taxpayer has transferred con-
trol over the property to the trust. Disallowing the deduction
under such circumstances arguably would result in horizontal
inequity, at least in a tax system that recognizes the trust and
its beneficiaries as separate taxpaying units from the grantor-
lessee.
Further, the gift-leaseback transaction arguably makes the
tax system more equitable by availing the Clifford tax-savings
device to a broader range of taxpayers. 49 High-income taxpay-
ers can afford to transfer dividend-paying stocks or other in-
come-producing investment assets to a Clifford trust and
thereby shift taxation of the income to the trust and its benefi-
ciaries. The gift-leaseback transaction is the only tax-savings
device of this type available to many professionals and other
middle-income taxpayers who simply do not have sufficient in-
come-producing investment assets to form a Clifford trust.5 0
Thus, the gift-leaseback transaction can be viewed as helping to
promote equity in the tax system.5 1
Finally, the courts seem concerned that the taxpayer has
transferred title to the property to the trust but retained physi-
cal possession of the property.5 2 Nothing seems to have hap-
49. See Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d at 1281-82; Quinlivan, 599 F.2d at 274.
50. See Simmons, supra note 3, at 196-97.
51. See Oliver, supra note 6, at 45. The dissenting judge in the Rosenfeld
case pointed out several infirmities in this contention. 706 F.2d at 1286 (MacMa-
hon, J., dissenting). First, he criticized the Rosenfeld and Quinlivan majorities
for not citing any legislative history in support of this argument. Such a cita-
tion, however, is hardly necessary, given the obvious tax-avoidance potential of
the short-term trust revealed in the case law history preceding the adoption of
the grantor trust rules and presumably known by Congress at the time it
adopted those rules.
In addition, the dissenting judge urged that the unfairness argument ig-
nores that a majority of taxpayers do not have assets lying around that they
can give away for ten-year periods and that taxpayers who do not own any
business or income-producing assets cannot take advantage of the Clifford trust
provisions. Further, he argued that disallowing the deduction would not be un-
fair if the taxpayer-lessee owned other assets that could form the corpus of a
Clifford trust.
These criticisms, however, all miss the point of the fairness argument. The
issue is not whether Congress intended all taxpayers to be able to take advan-
tage of the Clifford trust provisions, but whether Congress intended the Clifford
trust to be used as a tax-savings device and, if so, whether the gift-leaseback is
similar enough to the Clifford trust to warrant treating it as a valid device for
shifting income. The dissenting judge's opinion in Rosenfeld does not address
that issue.
52. See, e.g., Mathews, 520 F.2d at 325.
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pened except a paper transfer of title and a shift of income
from the donor to the donee in the form of the rental payments.
The taxpayer has uninterrupted use and possession of the
property; thus, the transaction arguably lacks economic
substance.
This argument evidences a misunderstanding of how the
tax law determines ownership of trust property for purposes of
equitably allocating the income tax burden on the income pro-
duced by that trust property. Under the grantor trust rules, if
the donor of the property transfers it to a trust for at least ten
years and complies with all of the other provisions of the gran-
tor trust rules, the trust is treated as the owner of the property
for federal income tax purposes for the duration of the trust.5 3
As long as the donor in a gift-leaseback situation has relin-
quished ownership of and control over the property under
those rules and uses the property during the term of the trust
strictly as a tenant under the terms of a binding lease agree-
ment, the donor's possessory interest should not be treated as
a retained interest in the property, but rather as a right or priv-
ilege conferred by the new owner, the trust, in exchange for the
rental payments. Under the tax law, the shift of ownership to
the trust, combined with the subsequent leaseback of the prop-
erty under the terms of a binding lease agreement, is sufficient
to permit the court to treat the taxpayer as having severed any
previous relationship to the property and as having instituted a
new relationship as a mere user-for-value of the property. Ac-
cordingly, interruption of the taxpayer's physical possession of
the property should not be a necessary prerequisite to creating
a valid rental deduction, and courts should ignore this concern
in formulating a solution to the gift-leaseback controversy.
B. AMBIGUOUS CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The other major source of confusion in the gift-leaseback
area is the absence of a clear statement of congressional intent.
No Internal Revenue Code provision specifically addresses the
gift-leaseback transaction. The only reference to the gift-lease-
53. See I.R.C. §§ 671-679 (1982); cf Keesling, Conflicting Conceptions of
Ownership in Taxation, 44 CALm. L. REV. 866, 869-70 (1956) (for income tax pur-
poses, the legal title or indivisible theory of ownership generally has been fol-
lowed; a lessee's interest in leased property, even in the sale-leaseback
situation, is in the nature of a privilege or license rather than a property inter-
est). But cf. Rice, supra note 2, at 1013 n.83, 1015 (donor's retention of use,
rights, or other indicia of ownership justifies taxing donor on the income from
the property).
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back transaction in the committee reports accompanying enact-
ment of the 1954 Code appears in the report of the Senate
Committee on Finance, which stated that "[t]his subpart [the
grantor trust rules] also has no application in determining the
right of a grantor to deductions for payments to a trust under a
transfer and leaseback arrangement. '54 The House report con-
tains no similar statement,5 5 and neither the Senate nor House
report refers to the gift-leaseback transaction in discussing the
rental deduction and the requirements of section 162 (a) (3).56
Consequently, the ambiguous statement in the Senate report
has been subject to varying interpretations as to its meaning
and importance.
The government and the Fourth Circuit5 7 have used this
language to block taxpayers' attempts to base the standards for
deductibility of rent in a gift-leaseback on the grantor trust
rules.5 8 The argument is that Congress indicated that the gran-
tor trust rules were inappropriate to resolve the tax conse-
quences of a gift-leaseback transaction in order that different
(and presumably, more stringent) standards would apply in de-
ciding the gift-leaseback issue. From this argument flows the
government's business-purpose test, a test that virtually en-
sures that a rental deduction will never be allowed in a gift-
leaseback transaction.59
This interpretation of congressional intent is unconvincing.
The language is ambiguous, and neither the government nor
those courts adopting the government's position have identified
54. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 365, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 5006. This same language was incorporated into the
regulations promulgated under § 671 of the Code. See Treas. Reg. § 1.671-1(c)
(1956).
55. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A212, reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4017, 4351-52.
56. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 196, reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4652; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A43-
44, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4352.
57. See Perry, 520 F.2d at 237 n.2; see also, e.g., Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d at 1285
(MacMahon, J., dissenting) ("the legislative history plainly states that the Clif-
ford trust sections are irrelevant in determining the deductibility of [the donor-
lessee'sJ rental payments"); Wiles v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 289, 298 (1972)
(quoting the language from the Senate Report), aO'd mer., 491 F.2d 1406 (5th
Cir. 1974).
58. A number of commentators have argued that compliance with the gran-
tor trust rules of the Code (I.R.C. §§ 671-679 (1982)) should suffice to allow the
deduction of rental payments in a gift-leaseback transaction. E.g., Comment,
Gift-Leaseback Transactions: An Unpredictable Tax-Savings Tool 53 TEmP.
L.Q. 569, 588-89 (1980); Albany Note, supra note 23, at 594-95; Cincinnati Note,
supra note 23, at 394-95.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 94-96.
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
why the gift-leaseback transaction so differs from the typical
Clifford trust transfer that the grantor trust rules should not
apply, at least by analogy, in formulating the standards for the
rental deduction in a gift-leaseback transaction. One sentence
buried in a lengthy committee report, and an ambiguous sen-
tence at that, hardly provides persuasive authority for ignoring
the application of the grantor trust rules if the gift-leaseback
transaction is sufficiently similar to the typical grantor trust
transfer.
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit's conclusion in Quin-
livan v. Commissioner60 that this statement indicates congres-
sional approval of the pre-1954 case law also seems
questionable. No reference to the pre-1954 cases appears in the
reports, even though Congress has not hesitated to refer to
court decisions of which it approves. Indeed, if the language of
the Senate report indicates congressional approval of the pre-
1954 appellate decisions in Skemp v. Commissioner61 and
Brown v. Commissioner,62 it is difficult to understand exactly
what Congress approved, since the Skemp and Brown deci-
sions provide few definite standards for resolving the gift-lease-
back controversy.
Skemp involved a gift-leaseback in trust, in which the gran-
tor appointed an independent bank as the trustee and retained
no reversionary interest in the trust property. The grantor
clearly arranged the leaseback prior to transferring the prop-
erty to the trust. The Seventh Circuit upheld the taxpayer-do-
nor's deduction of the rentals on the leaseback, rejecting the
government's argument that rent payments were not "re-
quired" within the meaning of section 23(a) (1) (A) of the 1939
Code,63 the statutory predecessor to section 162(a) (3), because
the taxpayers voluntarily created the situation. 64 Nonetheless,
the Seventh Circuit did not emphasize that the trustee was a
corporate trustee clearly independent of the grantor, nor did it
discuss the significance of the prearranged nature of the lease-
back or the grantor's failure to retain a reversionary interest in
the trust property, factors arguably important in the gift-lease-
back situation.
60. 599 F.2d 269, 274 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
61. 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
62. 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950).
63. Internal Revenue Code, ch. 2, § 23(a) (1), 53 Stat. 1, 12 (1939) (current
version at I.R.C. § 162(a) (3) (1982)).
64. 168 F.2d at 599-600. For a discussion of the "voluntariness" issue, see
supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 68:735
GIFT-LEASEBACK JURISPRUDENCE
In Brown, the taxpayers effected a gift-leaseback by trans-
ferring coal-producing property and the adjoining railroad sid-
ing to a trust for the benefit of their minor children and then
leasing back the property for use in their coal-mining business.
The donors retained no reversionary interest in the trust prop-
erty and appointed their attorney as trustee. In upholding the
taxpayers' deduction of the rents and royalties on the lease-
back, the Third Circuit stressed that the trustee was independ-
ent and that the grantors retained no reversionary interest.65
The Court did not suggest an approach for determining
whether a trustee was independent, however, nor did it discuss
the significance of the prearranged nature of the leaseback.
Thus, a reading of the Brown and Skemp decisions alone
provides few definite guidelines for testing the propriety of a
rental deduction in a gift-leaseback. It is, therefore, difficult to
believe that Congress, by enacting section 162 (a) (3) without
significant change from its 1939 Code predecessor, intended to
approve the uncertain approach of these decisions.
A more plausible explanation of the sentence in the senate
committee report is that Congress was aware of potential
abuses in gift-leaseback transactions that the grantor trust
rules were not designed to remedy, namely, using the leasehold
relationship to retain controls over the transferred property
that the grantor could not retain directly in the trust instru-
ment under the grantor trust rules and assigning a greater
amount of income to the donee than the fair rental value of the
property. Congress left it to the courts to design requirements
to remedy those abuses, and the courts can use by analogy, but
are not expressly bound by, the grantor trust rules in formulat-
ing those requirements.
Two last points can be made with relative certainty con-
cerning congressional intent. First, Congress gave at least
some consideration to the gift-leaseback transaction and de-
cided not to disallow the rental deduction in all cases. There-
fore, the integrated transaction business-purpose approach of
the government and the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, which re-
sults in the almost certain disallowance of the rental deduc-
tion,6 6 violates congressional intent. Second, the grantor trust
provisions evidence congressional intent that assignment-of-in-
come transactions involving transfers in trust be governed by a
set of statutory guidelines that provide certainty regarding the
65. 180 F.2d at 929.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 94-96.
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lines drawn. The approach currently used by the courts in the
gift-leaseback cases, which results in a set of confusing and
sometimes contradictory standards, violates that policy. There-
fore, another approach must be developed, one that takes into
account the policy considerations underlying the assignment-
of-income doctrine and yet provides the certainty evidenced by
the grantor trust provisions.
II. EXAMINATION OF THE DIFFERENT JUDICIAL TESTS
The government and the courts have developed various
tests to evaluate the propriety of the rental deduction in a gift-
leaseback transaction. A thorough analysis of these tests is vi-
tal to devising a logical and reasonably clear approach to this
transaction.
A. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEGRATED TRANSACTION BusnEss-
PURPOSE TEST
When challenging the rental deduction in a gift-leaseback
transaction, the government has argued that the deduction
should be disallowed because the transaction, viewed as an in-
tegrated whole, lacks a business purpose. That is, since the
property is essential to the business, the donor would not have
transferred it to a trust unless the donor had prearranged the
leaseback or at least was reasonably certain that the property
could be leased back for continued business use. Thus, the gift
and leaseback are interrelated steps of a single transaction and,
under the step-transaction doctrine,67 the business purpose in-
quiry required by section 162(a) (3) must apply to both parts of
the integrated transaction. Since no business purpose existed
for making the gift of the business property to the trust, the gift
part of the transaction fails the business-purpose test and no
rental deduction is allowed on the leaseback. 68
The genesis of this business-purpose test in the gift-lease-
back area can be traced to the first two appellate decisions in-
volving a gift and leaseback transaction: Skemp v.
Commissioner69 and Brown v. Commissioner.7 0 In both cases,
67. '"The step transaction doctrine... is a determination that some of the
several steps are part of a single overall integrated transaction, and the interim
transactions are denied tax significance." American Potash & Chem. Corp. v.
United States, 399 F.2d 194, 203 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
68. See authorities cited supra notes 11-13.
69. 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948), rev'g 8 T.C. 415 (1947).
70. 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1950), revg 12 T.C. 1095 (1949), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 814 (1950). The Skemp and Brown decisions are criticized in Note, The Gift
[Vol. 68:735
GIFT-LEASEBACK JURISPRUDENCE
the Tax Court disallowed the deduction of the rentals on the
leaseback, essentially treating the gift and leaseback as inte-
grated parts of a single transaction in which the donor-lessee
had not surrendered control over the property transferred to
the trust. 7 ' On appeal the government argued that the rental
deduction should not be allowed because it was incurred volun-
tarily and therefore did not satisfy the requirements of the stat-
utory predecessor of section 162(a)(3).72 In effect, the
government asserted that since the gift and leaseback were in-
terrelated parts of the same transaction, the rental obligation
arose not out of business necessity but out of the taxpayer's de-
sire to deflect income to members of his family. The Seventh
Circuit in Skemp 73 and the Third Circuit in Brown74 both cor-
and Leaseback. A New Tax Avoidance Gimmick, 59 YALE LJ. 1529, 1533-36
(1950). That Note is representative of much of the early commentary on the
gift-leaseback transaction, which somewhat simplistically attacked the arrange-
ment as an abusive tax-avoidance device for high-income taxpayers, regardless
of whether the transfer was made into a trust with an independent trustee. See
also Note, Use of a Trust and Lease-back as a Tax Avoidance Device, 51
COLUM. L. REV. 247, 248-49 (1951) (criticizing the Brown decision as inconsistent
with the Clifford short-term trust, sale-leaseback, and dividend-leaseback lines
of decisions). For a more analytical early critique of the court's favorable treat-
ment of the gift-leaseback transaction, see Cary, Current Tax Problems in Sale,
or Gift, and Lease-Back Transactions, 9 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 959, 974-78 (1951).
71. Both decisions reasoned that the "gift" was conditioned on the grant-
ors' ability to immediately lease the property back, which the grantors did.
Skemp, 8 T.C. at 421; Brown, 12 T.C. at 1101. If the gift and leaseback are
treated as interrelated parts of a single transaction, the overall transaction can
be viewed as a gift by the donor to the trust of a remainder interest only with a
reservation of a possessory term for years. Under this view, because the donee
trust never owns the possessory term, the donor's subsequent payments to the
trust cannot be consideration for the continued use and possession of the prop-
erty but rather are additional gifts to the trust. Accordingly, no deduction is al-
lowable under § 162(a) (3) for these gifts. See Brown, 12 T.C. at 1100; Skemp, 8
T.C. at 420-21; Cary, supra note 70, at 976; Froehlich, supra note 23, at 969-70; cf.
Keesling, supra note 53, at 869-70. Curiously, none of the courts of appeals de-
cisions following the government's integrated transaction approach in analyz-
ing the gift-leaseback transaction even mention this theory.
In a different context, one commentator has argued persuasively that the
sale and leaseback transaction, undertaken as a financing device, is in sub-
stance nothing more than a sale of a remainder interest in the property with a
reservation of a possessory term for years. Under this view of the sale-lease-
back transaction, the amount purportedly paid by the buyer to the seller for the
posessory term is in economic reality a secured loan. Accordingly, any rentals
the seller pays to the buyer for the possessory term are really an amortization
of that loan together with interest. See Del Cotto, Sale and Leaseback: A
Hollow Sound When Tapped?, 37 TAx L REV. 1 (1981).
72. See Internal Revenue Code, ch. 2, § 23(a)(1), 53 Stat. 1, 12 (1939) (cur-
rent version at LR.C. § 162(a) (3) (1982)); see also supra notes 38-40 and accom-
panying text.
73. 168 F.2d at 600.
74. 180 F.2d at 929-30.
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rectly rejected this argument, noting that the business deduc-
tion provision focuses on whether an obligation to pay rent for
the use of business property exists, not on how that obligation
was created.
The first appellate court to give at least tentative approval
to the government's business-purpose argument in the gift-
leaseback area was the Second Circuit in White v. Fitzpatrick.7 5
There the taxpayer gave his wife a valuable patent used in his
manufacturing business and agreed to pay royalties to her for a
license-back of exclusive manufacturing rights. At about the
same time, the taxpayer's wife purchased the real property
where the business was located and orally leased it to him for
the same rent that he had paid the previous owner. On the day
after her purchase of the property, the taxpayer gave his wife
cash in an amount very close to the purchase price of the prop-
erty. The issue before the court was whether the taxpayer
could deduct the rental and royalty payments as ordinary and
necessary business expenses under the 1939 Code predecessor
to section 162 of the current statute.7 6 Although the court re-
solved the deduction issue on the basis of the donor's failure to
relinquish sufficient control over the property, it intimated its
view of the business-necessity doctrine:
Gift and retained control must be regarded as inseparable parts of a
single transaction, especially since it was only in their sum total that
they had any reality in regard to the conduct of plaintiff's business. To
isolate them ... is to hide business reality behind paper pretense.
... The Clifford rule is clear, that this direct control, when fused
with the indirect control which we must imply from a formal but insub-
stantial assignment within the closed family group displaying no obvi-
ous business purpose, renders the assignment ineffective for federal
tax purposes. 7
7
75. 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952); cf. Finley v.
Commissioner, 225 F.2d 128, 133 (10th Cir. 1958) (disallowing the rental deduc-
tions in a gift-leaseback effected without a trust and in which formalities were
not observed, finding that the transaction neither served a business purpose
nor resulted in creation of a new economic unit); Kirschenmann v. Westover,
225 F.2d 69, 70-71 (9th Cir.) (disallowing rental deduction in gift-leaseback of
farmland to donors' minor daughter when husband's brother was appointed
guardian of the daughter's estate, finding that the rent on the leaseback was
unreasonably high and that the transaction lacked "business meaning" for tax
purposes), cert. denied 350 U.S. 834 (1955).
In Rosenfeld, the Second Circuit rejected the government's business-pur-
pose test but offered no explanation for its change of position and, in fact,
treated the issue as one of first impression in the circuit. 706 F.2d at 1279.
76. See supra note 72.
77. White, 193 F.2d at 400-01. Prior to 1948, spouses could not split income
through the filing of a joint return. See Internal Revenue Code, ch. 2,
§ 51(b) (1), 53 Stat. 1, 27 (1939). Today, they can file a joint return. See LR.C.
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The court neither cited authority nor offered any rationale to
support its intimation that the gifts required a business pur-
pose. The court simply jumped from finding that the gift and
leaseback were parts of an integrated transaction to the conclu-
sion that the gift part of the transaction must satisfy the busi-
ness-necessity requirement of the business expense deduction
provision. Finding that there was, of course, no business pur-
pose for the gift and further concluding that the leaseback indi-
cated that the donor had retained administrative control of the
property, the court proceeded to hold that the transaction
lacked economic substance and disallowed the taxpayer's de-
ductions for the rents and royalties. Thus, in White v. Fitzpat-
rick, there began to appear a meshing of the business-purpose,
integrated-transaction, and economic-reality rationales.
Although White v. Fitzpatrick was important in the devel-
opment of the government's business-purpose argument, the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Van Zandt v. Commissioner78 was
the first clear appellate court adoption of the argument in the
gift-leaseback situation. In Van Zandt, the taxpayer-physician
and his wife transferred real property and equipment used in
his medical practice to two irrevocable .trusts established for
the benefit of their two children for terms of ten years and two
months. The taxpayer was sole trustee of both trusts. On the
same day that the property and equipment were transferred to
the trusts, the taxpayer leased them back for use in his prac-
tice. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's disallowance of
the rental deductions on the leaseback, 79 holding that since the
gift and leaseback were interrelated parts of a single transac-
tion, both must have a business purpose. Because the only
purpose of the gift was to divert income to lower-bracket family
members, the court concluded that the transaction failed the
business-purpose test.80
§§ 6013, l(a) (1982). Accordingly, no income tax incentive currently exists for
spouses eligible to file a joint return to engage in income-splitting transactions,
such as the gift-leaseback, with each other.
78. 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
79. 40 T.C. 824 (1963). The Tax Court used the government's integrated
transaction business-purpose argument as an additional ground for disallowing
Dr. Van Zandt's rental deductions. Id. at 830-31.
80. In finding that the transaction lacked a business purpose, the Fifth Cir-
cuit pointed to the short term of the trust, the taxpayers' retention of a rever-
sionary interest, and the prearranged nature of the leaseback-all factors with
little or no relevance to a business-purpose inquiry. 341 F.2d at 444. The Van
Zandt court apparently confused the issue of whether the taxpayer surren-
dered control over the property to the trust with the issue of how to apply the
business-purpose standard in the gift-leaseback situation.
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The Van Zandt court cited no statutory or judicial author-
ity for its application of a business-purpose standard to a gratu-
itous transfer, other than its own decision in W.H. Armston Co.
v. Commissioner,8 ' a case involving the sale and leaseback of
equipment by a corporation to the wife of its president and
treasurer. In Armston, the court found that the purported sale
to the wife, the majority shareholder, lacked economic sub-
stance and affirmed the Tax Court's disallowance of the rental
deductions. Although the Armston court briefly discussed the
lack of business purpose for the corporation's sale of the prop-
erty to the wife as a factor supporting disallowance of the
rental deduction,8 2 a careful reading of the decision indicates
that the basis for the court's holding was the artificially-low
purchase price that the wife paid for the equipment-less than
one-half of the first year's rent.83 In other words, there was not
even the semblance of a real sale from the corporation to its
shareholder. Thus, because Armston is hardly persuasive au-
thority for a broad-scale requirement that the gift portion of a
gift-leaseback transaction need satisfy the business-purpose
standard, the murky business-purpose test of Van Zandt was
constructed with precedent that has little relevance to the is-
sues involved in the gift-leaseback transaction.
Despite the Van Zandt court's lack of supporting authority
for its business-purpose test, its approach was approved by the
Fourth Circuit in Perry v. United States.8 4 In Perry, two physi-
cians transferred their interests in the office building used in
their medical partnership to newly-created trusts for the bene-
fit of their children, naming an independent bank as the trustee
and retaining a reversionary interest in the corpus of the trust.
As part of a prearranged transaction, the physicians simultane-
ously leased the building back for use in their practice. In an-
nouncing its adoption of the Van Zandt business-purpose test,
the Perry court further explained the test's logic. The creation
of the trust and subsequent leaseback are mutually dependent
steps of a multistep transaction; accordingly, the taxpayer must
show a business purpose for the transaction as a whole before
any expenses incident to part of the transaction can be de-
81. 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951).
82. Id. at 533.
83. Id. at 532-33.
84. 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976). For de-
tailed discussions of the Perry decision, see Note, Taxation-Deductibility of
Rent Paid to Grantor Trust 51 TuL. L. REv. 192 (1976); Note, Taxation-Allow-
ance of Rental Deductions in the Gift-and-Leaseback Transaction, II WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 740 (1975).
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ducted under section 162.85 Since no business purpose justified
the creation of the trusts, the court disallowed the deduction of
the rental expenses on the leaseback.8 6
The Fourth Circuit in Perry, like the Fifth Circuit in Van
Zandt, seemed to confuse the business-purpose issue with the
question of whether the donor surrendered sufficient control
over the property to the donee, by focusing on factors such as
the reversionary interest retained by the donor and the portion
of the trust property rented for the donor's own use in deter-
mining whether there was a business purpose for the gift trans-
fer.87 Moreover, even correctly applied, the business-purpose
test posited by the government and adopted by the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits has a number of problems, the most serious of
which is that it evidences a misunderstanding of the appropri-
ate role of the business-purpose and related step-transaction
doctrines in the development of federal tax law.
Courts developed the business-purpose doctrine to prevent
distortion of technical statutory provisions through tax-moti-
vated transactions that satisfied the literal requirements of the
statute but lacked the basic purpose for which Congress
granted the favored tax treatment.88 In Gregory v. Helvering,89
85. 520 F.2d at 238-39.
86. Id. at 238-40.
87. The Perry court distinguished the Seventh Circuit's decision in Skemp
on the ground that the donor in Skemp may have had a business purpose for
the gift portion of the transaction because he leased back less than all of the
property transferred to the trust and did not retain any reversionary interest.
Id. at 239. According to the Perry court, these two factors may add up to a
business purpose for the gift portion of the transaction-namely, "'conveying
the property to the trustees for management and payment of income to the
beneficiaries."' Id. (quoting Van Zandt 341 F.2d at 442). In other words, the
Perry court speculated that the donor-lessee in Skemp may have had the busi-
ness purpose of divesting himself of the burden of managing the entire building
and its consequent interference with the conduct of his medical practice.
Again, this interpretation is a rather strained application of the business-pur-
pose test. See supra note 32.
88. See Summers, A Critique of the Business-Purpose Doctrine, 41 OR. L
Rlv. 38, 42-43 (1961).
89. 293 U.S. 465 (1935). In Gregory, Corporation A, wholly owned by Ms.
Gregory, transferred 1,000 shares of stock that it owned in Corporation B to a
new corporation, Corporation C, which then issued all of its shares to Ms. Greg-
ory. Within a few days, Corporation C was dissolved and the shares of Corpo-
ration B stock were distributed to Ms. Gregory, who immediately sold them at
a substantial gain. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals's treat-
ment of the transaction as an ordinary dividend distribution by Corporation A
to Ms. Gregory of the Corporation B shares, holding that the transaction did
not qualify for treatment as a tax-free divisive reorganization because it had no
business purpose.
For an excellent early discussion of the business-purpose rule enunciated
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the case credited with originating the judicial business-purpose
doctrine, the taxpayer attempted to effect an ordinary dividend
distribution through the guise of a divisive reorganization qual-
ifying as a tax-free reorganization. The Supreme Court devised
the business-purpose requirement to ensure that only corpo-
rate adjustments accomplished for business reasons would re-
ceive the favored treatment of the reorganization provisions,
thereby effectuating the congressional policy underlying those
provisions.90
In contrast, the courts have not identified any policy objec-
tive that will be served by requiring a taxpayer to show a busi-
ness purpose for the gift portion of the gift-leaseback
arrangement. Indeed, there is none. The donor's transfer of
the income-producing property and consequent shift of the tax
on the rental income to the trust is consistent with the congres-
sional policy underlying the enactment of the grantor trust pro-
vision.91 The donor is doing what Congress envisaged when it
formulated those rules.
Further, the government is missing a logical step in its ap-
plication of the business-purpose test. The government's argu-
ment assumes that since the gift and leaseback are interrelated
steps in an overall plan, the step-transaction doctrine applies,
and thus both steps of the transaction must satisfy the busi-
ness-necessity requirement of section 162(a) (3). But the step-
transaction doctrine, requiring that separate steps be taken to-
gether in attaching tax consequences, does not automatically
apply whenever there is an interrelationship between two for-
mally separate steps. In some areas, tax law does not require
combination of the mutually dependent steps even though they
were taken separately to reduce the taxpayer's income taxes; 92
in the Gregory case, see R. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 121-34 (3d se-
ries 1940).
90. 293 U.S. at 469-70.
91. See supra notes 35, 49-51, and accompanying text; cf. Estelle Morris
Trusts v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 20, 43 (1968) (rejecting the government's argu-
ment that the taxpayers' tax-avoidance motive and lack of business purpose for
setting up multiple trusts should invalidate the arrangement, stating "courts
should be wary of broad-scale incorporation of the doctrine of tax avoidance,'
or 'business purpose,' or 'sham' in an area ... fraught with its own ...
problems and nuances. At the very least, we are required to limit those judi-
cially developed doctrines to the situations which they were intended to
cover."), affld per curiam, 427 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1970).
92. See Blum, Motive, Inten and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34
U. Cm. L. REv. 485, 535-36 (1967). For an excellent survey discussion of the
step-transaction doctrine, see Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate
Reorganizations, 12 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 247 (1954).
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in effect, form is permitted to control and the tax consequences
of each step are separately analyzed. Deciding when the for-
mal separateness of the steps will control requires an analysis
of the policies underlying the income tax provision in question.
Looking at the gift-leaseback transaction, one sees a gift of
income-producing property to a trust in compliance with the
grantor trust provisions and an interrelated leaseback of the
property at fair rental value for use in the donor's business.
Nothing in the policy underlying the enactment of the grantor
trust rules or the policy underlying allowance of a rental deduc-
tion requires aggregation of these steps. In fact, the grantor
trust rules evidence congressional intent that form will control
assignments of income made through a trust, provided the do-
nor satisfies the requirements of sections 673 through 679 of the
Code. In effect, a transfer meeting those requirements will be
treated as a transfer of income-producing property rather than
a transfer of only the income from the property, even though in
substance the trust receives nothing more than the right to re-
ceive the income from the property for a period of at least ten
years. Requiring the gift and leaseback portions of the transac-
tion to be analyzed together in applying the business-purpose
standard is inconsistent with that congressional judgment.93
Finally, as others have noted,94 the income tax definition of
"gift" is incompatible with the business-purpose concept. In
Commissioner v. Duberstein,95 the Supreme Court held that the
trarisferor's dominant motive controlled the determination of
whether the transfer was a gift for federal income tax purposes
and that a gift must proceed from a "'detached and disinter-
ested generosity"' rather than from "'the incentive of antici-
pated benefit' of an economic nature."9 6 Thus, if the donor
established a business purpose for the transfer to the trust, it
would no longer constitute a gift for income tax purposes. The
government proposes a test that could never be satisfied in any
gift-leaseback transaction, because if there is a business pur-
pose for the transfer to the trust it is no longer a gift, and if the
transaction is truly gratuitous the transaction fails the govern-
93. See Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d at 1281-82.
94. See, e.g., May, 76 T.C. at 21 (Goffe, J., concurring); Friedlander, supra
note 23, at 297.
95. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
96. Id. at 285 (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956) and
Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937)). For a persuasive criticism of
the § 102 gift exclusion and the Duberstein approach to defining the term "gift"
for federal income tax purposes, see Klein, An Enigma in the Federal Income
Tax: The Meaning of the Word "Gift" 48 M-NN. L. REV. 215 (1963).
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ment's business-purpose test. The government in reality is pro-
posing a per se disallowance of the rental deduction in all gift-
leaseback transactions. Any such rule of law should come only
from Congress.
B. THE "ECONOMiC-REALITY" TEST OF MATHEWS
Mathews v. Commissioner9 7 presented yet another opportu-
nity for the Fifth Circuit to scrutinize the gift-leaseback trans-
action and clarify its business-purpose test. Instead, it added
to the confusion in gift-leaseback jurisprudence by applying yet
another test to evaluate the propriety of the rental deduction in
a gift-leaseback transaction. Mathews involved the taxpayers'
transfer of interests in real property used in their funeral busi-
ness to separate irrevocable trusts created for each of their four
minor children and a simultaneous leaseback of the property,
with year to year renewal options, for use in their business.
The trusts were created for terms of ten years plus one day,
with the property reverting to the taxpayers upon termination
of the trust. The taxpayers' attorney served as trustee. The
Tax Court upheld the deduction of the rental payments, 98 an-
nouncing a four-part test that generally has been followed in
other circuits.99 The Fifth Circuit, however, refused to follow
this test and reversed, disallowing the rent deductions because
the trusts were "economic nullities" and the transaction,
viewed as an integrated whole, lacked "economic reality."100
The Mathews court considered it irrelevant that the trustee ac-
ted independently of the grantors and that the rent negotia-
tions between grantors and the trustee produced a reasonable
rent. The crucial element, according to the court, was that the
prearranged nature of the leaseback virtually guaranteed the
grantors the use of the property for the term of the trusts.'0 '
Interestingly, the court cast further doubt upon the validity of
its own business-purpose test enunciated in Van Zandt by inti-
mating that not even a valid business purpose for the gift
would validate the transaction. 0 2 The court offered only a cita-
tion to its own per curiam affirmance in Furman v. Commis-
97. 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
98. Mathews v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 12 (1973).
99. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
100. 520 F.2d at 325.
101. Id.
102. The Fifth Circuit noted:
We think Van Zandt teaches that it is not sufficient merely to serve up
some 'business purpose' as some of the cases put it. The fact taxpay-
ers can conjure up some reason why a businessman would enter into
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sioner10 3 and the dissenting opinion in the Ninth Circuit's
Brooke v. United States 0 4 decision as authority for its new eco-
nomic-reality standard.
The Fifth Circuit's Mathews decision contributed little to
the development of gift-leaseback jurisprudence except to
muddy the waters even further within the Fifth Circuit. After
Mathews, it was possible to discern three different approaches
to the gift-leaseback issue within that circuit: the business-pur-
pose test of Van Zandt; the economic-reality test of Mathews;
and a second economic-reality standard adopted in the pre-Ma-
thews decision of Audano v. United States,l0 5 which considered
factors similar to those used by the Tax Court and those courts
of appeals that have rejected the government's integrated-
transaction business-purpose test. Since the Mathews court
did not decisively reject the Van Zandt and Audano ap-
proaches, it is unclear whether they retain any vitality even
within the Fifth Circuit.
this sort of arrangement-tax consequences aside-does not foreclose
inquiry. Rather there must be 'economic reality'....
Id. (footnotes and citation omitted). The business purposes proffered by the
taxpayers in Mathews were insulating the transferred property from the tax-
payers' creditors and discouraging employees from aspiring to partnership in
the business. Id. at 325 n.7. The Fifth Circuit found that the trust-leaseback ar-
rangement in Mathews fulfilled neither purpose because the taxpayers' rever-
sionary interests and leasehold rights in the property were probably attachable
by creditors, and the profitable nature of the taxpayers' business, rather than
the identity of the owners of the business assets, was the prime motivating fac-
tor for employees who aspired to partnership. The court did not decide
whether the stated purposes would establish a business purpose for the trans-
action in a case in which the taxpayer could establish that the gift-leaseback
actually served such purposes. The Mathews court, however, seemed to reject
the business-purpose test in favor of a more vaguely defined economic-reality
standard. Id. at 325.
103. 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967), affg per curiam 45 T.C. 360 (1966).
104. 468 F.2d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1972) (Ely, J., dissenting).
105. 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970). In Audano, the Fifth Circuit disallowed the
taxpayer's rental deductions in a gift-leaseback transaction involving medical
equipment on the ground that the trusts were "economic nullities." The court
based its conclusion on the absence of a written lease evidencing the leaseback
tradition, the excessive amount of the rent, and the failure of the trustee to act
independently of the donor-lessee. As suggested in the text of this Article, it is
possible to read the Audano analysis consistently with the majority approach
used by the Tax Court and by the Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits.
In Quinlivan, the Eighth Circuit questioned whether the split of judicial
opinion on the gift-leaseback transaction was within the Fifth Circuit itself,
rather than among the different courts of appeals, since the Fourth Circuit's
Perry decision, the only appellate decision outside of the Fifth Circuit ex-
pressly adopting the government's business-purpose test, could be distin-
guished from the majority approach on the basis of the illusory nature of the
Perry trustee's independence. 599 F.2d at 273 n.4.
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Apart from its detrimental effect on the clarity of precedent
within the Fifth Circuit, the Mathews decision suffers from an-
other major defect. It offers nothing in the way of definitive
guidelines or even an analytical framework to be used in decid-
ing subsequent cases, and the court gave no indication of how a
gift-leaseback transaction could be structured to satisfy its eco-
nomic-reality standard. Since the court ignored that the trust-
ees were independent of the grantor and charged reasonable
rental amounts and focused instead on the prearranged nature
of the leaseback, a factor that is at least implicitly present in
virtually every gift-leaseback transaction,106 the inescapable
conclusion is that the Mathews economic-reality test is another
attempt by the Fifth Circuit to formulate a per se disallowance
rule for the deductibility of rent in a gift-leaseback transaction.
C. THE MAJORITY VIEW OF THE GIFT-LEASEBACK AS A
BIFURCATED TRANSACTION
Those courts rejecting the government's integrated transac-
tion business-purpose test have variously weighted a number
of factors, including the reasonableness of the rental, the ab-
sence of a written lease, the independence of the trustee, the
presence of a reversionary interest in the grantor-lessee, and
the prearranged nature of the leaseback, in analyzing the valid-
ity of the gift-leaseback transaction. This section of the Article
critically analyzes the use of these factors in deciding the gift-
leaseback issue.
Until its recent multiple-opinion decision in May v. Com-
missioner,1 07 the Tax Court led attempts to develop a coherent
approach for analyzing the gift-leaseback transaction. After its
initial hostile decisions in the gift-leaseback area had been re-
versed on appeal,108 the Tax Court began to devise a more theo-
106. See Rosenfeld, 43 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) at 1357.
107. 76 T.C. 7 (1981), affld, 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984). In May, there were
five opinions: majority, concurring, and three dissents. Two judges joined
Judge Goffe's concurring opinion and four judges dissented. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the Tax Court's decision in May, see Comment, Grantor Control and
its Effect on Gift-Leaseback Rental Deductions-May v. Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service, 15 SuFFoLK U.L. REv. 1067 (1981).
108. See Brown v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 1095 (1949), rev'd, 180 F.2d 926 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); Skemp v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 415(1947), rev'd, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948). In both cases, the Tax Court disal-
lowed the rental deductions on the gift-leaseback transactions, reasoning that,
because the leaseback was prearranged, the donor-lessees had not transferred
any present interest in the property to the donee trusts and thus their sup-
posed rental payments could not be required for the use of the property during
the retained leasehold term. See supra note 71. For extensive discussions of
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retically sound approach to analyzing the transaction,109
culminating in a test first applied in Mathews v. Commis-
sioner"O and further developed in subsequent Tax Court deci-
sions. The Tax Court's Mathews test has four parts: (1) the
leaseback should normally be in writing and must require pay-
ment of a reasonable rent; (2) the leaseback (as distinguished
from the gift) must have a bona fide business purpose; (3) the
grantor must not possess a disqualifying "equity" in the prop-
erty within the meaning of § 162(a) (3); and (4) the grantor
must not retain substantially the same control over the prop-
erty that he or she had before the gift transfer."'
The Mathews test reflected a careful analysis by the Tax
Court of its own gift-leaseback jurisprudence as well as an ex-
amination of those appellate court decisions that had already
considered the issue. Accordingly, the Mathews four-part test
has been used by the Tax Court,112 the Eighth Circuit in Quinli-
van,113 and the Second Circuit in Rosenfeld, 114 as a focal point
for analyzing the gift-leaseback transaction. The test provides
a useful frame of reference for analyzing the various factors
considered by the courts in deciding the propriety of the rental
deductions in a gift-leaseback transaction.
the early cases in the gift-leaseback area, including the Tax Court cases, see
Webster, Transfers to Trusts with Leasebacks-Drafting and Other Suggestions
for the Trust and Lease Agreements, 8 MAJOR TAx PLAN. 319 (1956).
109. See, e.g., Oakes v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 524 (1965), nonacq. 1967-1 C.B.
3; Potter v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 200 (1956), acq. 1957-2 C.B. 6; Felix v. Com-
missioner, 21 T.C. 794 (1954), nonacq. 1956-2 C.B. 10.
110. 61 T.C. 12 (1973), rev'd, 620 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
967 (1976).
111. 61 T.C. at 18-20.
112. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, 43 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1353; May, 76 T.C. 7;
Lerner, 71 T.C. 290; Quinlivan, 37 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 346; Serbousek v.
Commissioner, 36 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 479 (1977). Because the Golsen
principle requires the Tax Court to follow the precedent of the circuit in which
the taxpayer's appeal would lie, the Tax Court has followed the business-pur-
pose and economic-reality standards of Van Zandt, Mathews, and Perry in
cases appealable to the Fourth or Fifth Circuits. See authorities cited supra
note 14.
113. Quinlivan, 599 F.2d at 273.
114. Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d at 1280-82. The Ninth Circuit in May sustained the
taxpayer's deduction of the rentals on a leaseback but did not explicitly adopt
the four-part Mathews test. Instead, the court used the "sufficiency of the prop-
erty interest transferred" test that it first enunciated in the Brooke decision
and focused on the following four factors: the duration of the transfer; the con-
trols retained by the donor; the use of the gift property for the benefit of the
donor; and the independence of the trustee. 723 F.2d at 1436. This approach is
similar to the Mathews test.
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1. Reasonable Rent Payment and Written Lease.
To establish the validity of the gift-leaseback arrangement,
the donor must sever his or her ownership interest in the
leased property for at least the duration of the trust and must
enter into a new relationship as lessee under a bona fide rental
agreement. The key indicator of the bona fide nature of the
leaseback is the reasonableness of the rent paid by the grantor
to the trust. As long as the rent paid is reasonable, the grantor
assigns only the inherent income-producing potential of the
property to the donee trust. In essence, the amount of income
assigned is the same as it would be were the trust to rent the
property to some third party and the donor rent replacement
property for his or her business.
That a grantor pays less than the reasonable rental value of
the property, an unlikely occurrence in a gift-leaseback transac-
tion,"5s suggests that the grantor has not relinquished sufficient
control over the beneficial enjoyment of the property. In other
words, the grantor has retained one of the indicia of property
ownership, enjoyment of use of the property without having to
pay a fair rent for it. On the other hand, that the grantor pays
more than the reasonable rental value of the property, a more
likely problem with the gift-leaseback arrangement, suggests
that the grantor has not entered into a bona fide lease arrange-
ment but instead is using the lease as a subterfuge for the as-
signment of income from sources other than the transferred
property. The excess of the rent paid over the reasonable
rental value of the property represents a gift to the donee of a
portion of the income accruing from the value of the grantor's
services or other business property, rather than a transfer of in-
come from the property that has been transferred to the trust.
Thus, the reasonableness of the rental should be a key factor in
the courts' analysis of the validity of the gift-leaseback
transaction.
Unfortunately, this portion of the Mathews test has not re-
ceived the attention it deserves from the government, courts, or
115. It is unlikely that the donor-lessee will pay less than a reasonable
rental because the donor's objective is to shift income to the lower-bracket do-
nee in the form of the rental payments. The greater the rental payment is, the
greater the amount of income that is assigned. See Froehlich, supra note 23, at
970; Simmons, supra note 3, at 203. A donor might pay less than a reasonable
rental, however, if the donor were having cash flow problems and could not af-
ford to pay the full fair rental value of the property but nonetheless wanted to
assign at least some income to the donee through the gift-leaseback
transaction.
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commentators. Only a few gift-leaseback cases actually have
used the unreasonableness of the rental as one of the bases for
disallowing the rental deduction.116 In other cases, the govern-
ment surprisingly has conceded that the rental is reasonable,
and the court has correspondingly refused to consider the is-
sue, despite strong evidence that the rental actually was exces-
sive. 117 Some commentators have argued that at most an
unreasonably high rental requires that the court disallow the
deduction of that portion of the rental payment that is exces-
sive.11 8 All of these authorities, however, have essentially
missed the purpose of the Mathews requirement that the rent
be reasonable in amount. An unreasonably high or low rental
indicates the grantor's disrespect of the substance of the gift-
leaseback arrangement. As in other transactions involving re-
lated parties, if the parties themselves do not respect the for-
malities of the arrangement or treat the transaction as a real
one, they can hardly expect the government or a court to do so.
Accordingly, although not conclusive, the presence of an unrea-
116. See Audano, 428 F.2d at 257; Penn v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 144, 152-53
(1968); ef. Kirschenmann, 225 F.2d at 70-71 (finding that the rent on the lease-
back was unreasonably high and that the transaction lacked "business mean-
ing" for tax purposes).
117. See Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d 1277 (gross rent determined to be reasonable in
amount); May, 76 T.C. 7 (government conceding the reasonableness of the
rental for the tax year in issue). But see Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d at 1284 (MacMa-
hon, J., dissenting) (concluding that rental payments exceeded the reasonable
rental value of the property, particularly in light of donor's agreement to re-
main liable on the mortgage encumbering the property); May, 76 T.C. at 40
(Wilbur, J., dissenting) (characterizing the annual rental as "outrageously
high" and concluding that the deduction of the rentals on the leaseback should
have been disallowed).
118. See, e.g., Friedlander, supra note 23, at 303-04, cf. Commissioner v.
Greenspun, 156 F.2d 917, 921 (5th Cir. 1946) (upholding the validity of a lease-
back transaction effected through a trust, with the donor's wholly-owned corpo-
ration as lessee, but treating the excessive portion of the rentals paid by the
corporation to the trust as nondeductible dividends to the donor).
Another argument in favor of disallowing only that portion of the donor's
rental deduction that exceeds a reasonable rental charge for the property can
be made by analogizing to the approach the Internal Revenue Code takes in
the family partnership area with respect to partnerships in which capital is a
material income-producing factor. Under § 704(e) (2), if the donee-partner's
share of the family partnership's income is excessive because the donor has
not been adequately compensated for his or her services to the partnership or
retained share of the partnership capital, the remedy is reallocation of a por-
tion of the partnership income from the donee-partner to the donor to compen-
sate the donor for those services or capital. I.RC. § 704(e) (2) (1982); Treas.
Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (3) (i) (1956). In other words, an excessive allocation of part-
nership income to the donee-partner generally does not, in and of itself invali-
date the family partnership arrangement under § 704(e). Cf. LR.C. § 1366(e)
(1982) (reallocation of income among shareholder family group for services or
capital rendered to subchapter S corporation).
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sonably high or low rental on the leaseback should bear heavily
against the taxpayer's attempt to demonstrate the economic
substance of the arrangement.
Another objective indicator of the parties' good faith in cre-
ating a bona fide rental arrangement is the existence of a writ-
ten lease. As noted by a dissenting judge in the Tax Court's
May decision," 9 parties entering into a commercial lease as
part of an arm's length transaction normally insist that the
terms of their rental agreement be reduced to writing. The
rights and obligations of the lessor and lessee, the amount of
the rent, the circumstances under which the rent may be in-
creased, and the other terms of the rental relationship "are suf-
ficiently complex and the legal consequences important
enough" to dictate executing a written lease.12 0 The absence of
a written lease in a gift-leaseback situation, therefore, strongly
indicates that the arrangement lacks economic substance.
The written lease also serves as a benchmark for the court
in deciding whether the donor has actually relinquished control
over the property for the term of the trust. If the terms of the
leasehold relationship are not reduced to writing, it is more dif-
ficult for a court to determine whether the donor has actually
dealt with the property in the way that an arms-length tenant
would. Without a writing, there is a problem of proving the
existence of a binding leasehold relationship that limits the do-
nor's use of the property to a use consistent with the rights and
obligations of a tenant.121
All of this suggests that the Mathews requirement of a writ-
ten lease is important in establishing the substance of the gift-
leaseback arrangement. In the gift-leaseback transaction, as in
other transactions between related parties, observance of all
the formalities by the parties may be essential, although not
sufficient, to establish the validity of the arrangement.122 Un-
fortunately, like the reasonable rent requirement, courts have
applied the written lease requirement somewhat loosely. 23 In
119. May, 76 T.C. at 36 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 18-19 (Goffe, J., concurring).
122. See, e.g., Penn v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 144, 152 (1968); cf. Wiles v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 289, 298-99 (1972) (informality of rent arrangement indic-
ative of donors' retained control over the trust property), aff'd mem., 491 F.2d
1406 (5th Cir. 1974).
123. See May, 76 T.C. at 14 (no written lease agreement; court satisfied that
terms of the lease were "clearly understood by the trustees and faithfully ob-
served by the parties" and thus sustained deduction of the rentals on the lease-
back); Brooke, 468 F.2d at 1157 (stating that the absence of a written lease tends
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fact, in the pre-Mathews decision of Brooke v. United States,124
the court treated the absence of a written lease as a positive
factor evidencing the economic substance of the gift-leaseback
arrangement, reasoning that the absence of a written lease ne-
gated any argument that the donor-lessee's tenancy amounted
to a reversion since the trustee could terminate the oral lease
at any time.125 The logic of this approach is difficult to fathom.
In sum, to provide the leaseback relationship with the at-
tributes of a bona fide leasehold relationship there should be a
written lease agreement binding the lessee to pay a reasonable
rent for continued use of the property. The absence of such at-
tributes strongly suggests that the parties have not treated the
transaction as one with economic substance, usually a fatal
flaw in transactions between closely-related parties.
2. Business-Purpose.
As has been discussed earlier in this Article,126 judicial
opinion is split as to how the business-purpose test applies to
gift-leaseback transactions. The Fourth and Fifth127 Circuits
consider the gift and leaseback as integrated parts of a single
transaction and thus require a business purpose for both the
gift of the property to the trust and the leaseback.128 In con-
trast, the Tax Court and the Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits have treated the gift-leaseback as a bifur-
cated transaction and applied the business-purpose standard
only to the leaseback portion of the transaction.129 Under this
view, a showing that the use of the property was necessary in
the donor-lessee's business, a factor which apparently has
never been challenged in any of the reported gift-leaseback
cases, satisfies the business-purpose test. The bifurcated treat-
ment of the gift-leaseback transaction is the clear majority view
and is likely to be followed in subsequent cases for the reasons
previously discussed.
to help establish the substance of the gift-leaseback transaction and sustaining
the deduction of the rentals); see also Friedlander, supra note 23, at 304-05
(neither a written lease nor a binding lease agreement necessary to sustain the
deduction of the rentals on the leaseback, only payment by the donor of a rea-
sonable rental for whatever period the property is actually used is necessary).
124. 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972).
125. Id. at 1157.
126. See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
127. See cases cited supra notes 11-12.
128. See supra notes 68-96 and accompanying text.
129. See cases cited supra notes 14-19.
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3. Disqualifying Equity and the Control Issue.
The last two requirements of the Mathews test are interre-
lated and should be analyzed together.130 In jurisdictions that
reject the government's business-purpose test, the crux of the
gift-leaseback issue is whether the donor-lessee has surren-
dered sufficient control over the property for the transaction to
be respected for federal income tax purposes. If the donor-
lessee has not relinquished control over the trust property, the
principles developed under the assignment-of-income doctrine
require that the leaseback and the consequent assignment of
the grantor's income through the rental payments be disre-
garded for tax purposes. Likewise, if the donor has not relin-
quished sufficient control over the property, he or she remains
the owner of the property for tax purposes and possesses dis-
qualifying equity interest in the trust property within the
meaning of section 162(a) (3). The remainder of this section fo-
cuses on the factors courts have used in analyzing these two
parts of the Mathews test.
a. Grantor's Retention of a Reversionary Interest
The grantor's retention of a reversionary interest in the
trust corpus has surfaced in two different contexts in gift-lease-
back jurisprudence. First, the grantor's retention of a rever-
sionary interest has been considered a factor in determining
whether the grantor relinquished sufficient dominion and con-
trol over the leased property.1 3 1 This analysis is a throwback to
Helvering v. Clifford,13 2 in which the five-year duration of the
trust was one of the factors the Supreme Court used in finding
that, in substance, the grantor remained the owner of the trust
property. Logically, at some point the trust's duration is so
short that the grantor actually remains the substantial owner of
130. For a good discussion of the interrelationship between the disqualify-
ing equity and control requirements of the Mathews test, see May, 76 T.C. at 22-
33 (Goffe, J., concurring).
131. E.g., id. at 25-33 (transfer of reversion by grantor necessary to ensure
that no disqualifying equity in the property exists, if the trustee is not in-
dependent), aff'd, 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984) (Ninth Circuit emphasizing the
absolute nature of the transfer in upholding the taxpayer's rental deductions);
see also Brooke, 468 F.2d at 1157 (emphasizing the absolute nature of the trans-
fer as a factor distinguishing the case from the Clifford and Van Zandt deci-
sions); of. Perry, 520 F.2d at 239 (following Fifth Circuit's integrated transaction
business-purpose test, disallowing the rental deductions on the leaseback, and
pointing to the donor's retention of a reversionary interest as a factor evidenc-
ing the lack of business purpose for the gift transfer).
132. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
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the property. In the context of a gift-leaseback, this means that
no rental deduction is allowed since a person cannot be both
lessor and lessee. The issue is where to draw the line-five
years, ten years, ninety-nine years, or in perpetuity-as the
minimum amount of time that the grantor must transfer the
property to the trust to avoid being treated as the owner of the
trust property for income tax purposes.
Congress answered this question in the grantor trust provi-
sions, somewhat arbitrarily drawing the line at ten years. If the
reversionary interest is not intended to take effect for at least
ten years, the grantor will not be treated as the owner of the
trust property because of the duration of the interest trans-
ferred.133 In a broader sense, Congress is saying that a transfer
for ten years or longer will be treated as a transfer of the prop-
erty, rather than as a mere transfer of income from the prop-
erty, thus effectively assigning any income from the property
for the trust's duration. 34 Although the grantor trust rules are
not binding on a court in deciding gift-leaseback cases,135 the
congressional determination that shifting property to a trust for
at least ten years also shifts ownership of the property and tax-
ation of any rental income to the trust supports the argument
that the donor's reversionary interest in a gift-leaseback situa-
tion should not be treated as an indication of the donors' re-
tained control over the trust property. Since the gift-leaseback
is merely another means of assigning income from property
through use of a trust, there is no sound policy reason to treat
the question of duration differently when the issue is whether
the trust is the owner of the property for rental deduction pur-
poses than when it is determining the owner for income attri-
bution purposes.
The grantor's retention of a reversionary interest has sur-
faced in a second, more technical sense in the courts' analysis
of the language of section 162(a) (3), which allows a rental de-
duction only for property in which the taxpayer has no equity.
The government has argued that a grantor who retains a rever-
sionary interest in the property automatically has a disqualify-'
ing equity interest within the meaning of section 162(a) (3) and
is thereby precluded from deducting the rental payments on
133. LR.C. § 673(a) (1982); cf. Rev. Ru. 55-38, 1955-1 C.B. 389 (treating an ir-
revocable assignment of trust income for a minimum of ten years as a disposi-
tion of a "substantial interest in the trust property" by analogy to the ten-year
cutoff in the Clifford trust regulations of the 1939 Code).
134. See, e.g., J. PESCHEL & E. SPURGEON, supra note 6, 1 12.02, at 12-4.
135. See supra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
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the leaseback. The Tax Court's decision in Oakes v. Commis-
sioner136 supported this argument, broadly defining the term
"equity" as "a right of redemption, a reversionary interest, a
right to specific performance, or in general any right respecting
property which traditionally would have been enforceable by
means of an equitable remedy."137 Although this definition of
"equity" later was rejected decisively by the Tax Court in Ma-
thews v. Commissioner,138 it was inexplicably resurrected by
the majority in the Tax Court's May139 decision, which upheld
the donor's rental deductions on the leaseback but emphasized
that he had not retained any reversionary interest in the trust
property. Three other courts have accepted this argument as a
ground for disallowing the rental deduction in a gift-leaseback
transaction, with little or no analysis or supporting authority,140
while several other courts, including the Second Circuit in the
recent Rosenfeld decision, have pointed to the grantor's relin-
quishment of the reversionary interest or failure to retain any
such interest in the original gift transfer as a fact supporting
136. 44 T.C. 524 (1965), nonacq. 1967-1 C.B. 3.
137. Id. at 531. In Oakes, because the donor-lessee transferred his rever-
sionary interest to his wife midway during the first of the three tax years in is-
sue, the court held that he had not retained any "equity" in the leased
property. Id. at 530.
138. 61 T.C. at 19-25.
139. May, 76 T.C. at 13. As the Mathews court explained, the Oakes defini-
tion of equity, if taken to its logical conclusion, can never be satisfied because
every lessee arguably has enforceable rights of an equitable nature in the
leasehold interest. Mathews, 61 T.C. at 21. The Tax Court in May, however,
found that the donor-lessee, who had not retained any reversionary interest in
the trust property, possessed no such equitable rights in the leased property. It
therefore remains unclear whether the May court intended to suggest that a
grantor's reversionary interest in the trust property would be treated as a dis-
qualifying equity. Although the Ninth Circuit did not discuss the disqualifying
equity issue in its affirmance of the Tax Court's decision, the court did empha-
size the absolute nature of the transfer in concluding that the transaction satis-
fied its "sufficiency of property interest transferred" test. May, 723 F.2d at 1436-
37.
140. See Chace v. United States, 303 F. Supp 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (following
the Fifth Circuit's business-purpose test and disallowing the rental deduction;
as an alternative ground, holding that grantor's option to renew the lease and
reversionary interest constituted a disqualifying equity in the property, no
analysis or supporting authority), affd per curiamr, 422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970);
Hall v. United States, 208 F.Supp 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962) (disallowing rental deduc-
tion in a trust-leaseback, citing White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951);
as an alternative ground, holding that grantors' reversionary interests were a
disqualifying equity in the property, no analysis or supporting authority); Gib-
bons v. United States, 70-1 U.S. TAx CAS. (CCH) 1 9365 (D.C.N.M. 1970) (disal-
lowing rental deductions on a leaseback on the ground that the grantor's
reversionary interest constituted a disqualifying equity, without analyzing the
issue and citing only the district court's opinion in Chace in support of its
holding).
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the validity of a gift-leaseback arrangement, again without pro-
viding analysis or supporting reasoning.141 These results are
somewhat surprising given that the government's argument has
scant support in the policies underlying either section
162(a) (3) or the assignment-of-income doctrine.
First, although nothing in the legislative history of section
162 (a) (3) or its statutory predecessors explains the meaning of
the "no equity" phrase, 42 it primarily functions as a basis for
denying a deduction for rental payments that are made to ac-
quire actual ownership, rather than mere use and possession,
of the property. 43 Thus, a taxpayer may not deduct payments
on a mortgage secured by the property or payments in excess
of the fair rental value of the property when the lessee has an
option to purchase the property and the "rental" payments are
applied to the purchase price.144 In other words, the "no eq-
uity" requirement denies rental deductions where the rental
payments enlarge the payor's ownership interest in the prop-
erty. Since the rental payments in a gift-leaseback do not en-
large the donor-lessee's ownership interest in the property, a
number of courts have correctly held that the grantor's reten-
tion of a reversionary interest in the trust property does not
constitute a disqualifying equity interest. 45
141. See, e.g., Rosenfeld 706 F.2d at 1282 (noting that the absence of any re-
versionary interest in the donor was a factor distinguishing the Skemp and
Brown decisions from its own decision in White v. Fitzpatrick); Brown, 180
F.2d at 929; Skemp, 168 F.2d at 600; cf May, 76 T.C. at 22-33 (Goffe, J., concur-
ring) (donor-lessee's reversionary interest may constitute disqualifying equity
if trustee not independent).
142. As noted by the Tax Court in Mathews, the "no equity" requirement
was first enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 12(a) (1), 39 Stat.
756, 767. 61 T.C. at 20 n.4.
143. See 1 B. BnTrrER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs
22.3 (1981); Lutkins, Tax Treatment of the Lease With Option to Purchase: Is
Allocation the Answer?, 11 TAx L. REV. 65, 68-73 (1955) (citing authorities).
144. See Lutkins, supra note 143, at 70-71.
145. See Quinlivan, 599 F.2d at 272 (upholding the validity of gift-leaseback
transaction in which the grantor retained a reversionary interest in the leased
property); Perry v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 15, 19-20 (E.D.N.C. 1974) (uphold-
ing the donor's rental deductions on the leaseback and rejecting the govern-
ment's alternative argument that the donor's reversionary interest in the trust
property constituted a disqualifying equity interest), rev'd, 520 F.2d 235 (4th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976); Mathews, 61 T.C. at 19-24 (deci-
sively rejecting the government's "equity" argument in gift-leaseback area and
holding that the term "equity" does not include a reversionary interest that "is
scheduled to become possessory after the expiration of a lessor's term of
years"); see also Engel v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (uphold-
ing validity of trust-leaseback transaction in which the donor-lessee retained a
reversionary interest in the property; no discussion of the disqualifying equity
issue), affid mer., 562 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1977); cf. Lerner v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.
290 (1978) (holding that a corporate lessee did not possess a disqualifying eq-
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In addition, always treating the grantor's reversionary in-
terest in a Clifford trust as a disqualifying equity conflicts with
the congressional determination that for federal income tax
purposes a transfer in trust for at least ten years creates a
property interest in the donee separate and distinct from the
donor's reversionary interest. 4 6 In effect, ownership of the
property is divided horizontally in accordance with the dura-
tion of the donor's and donee's interests and the trust arrange-
ment creates two separate property interests. The donee owns
the property during the term of the trust and the donor only
owns the property after the trust term. Thus, after the gift
transfer, the donor has no property interest in the donee's in-
terest, although through the leaseback the donor acquires the
right to use the donee's property in return for paying a fair
rent. The "no-equity" requirement of section 162(a) (3) focuses
on whether the lessee actually owns an interest in the leased
property. Since the donor's reversionary interest-the only in-
terest the donor actually owns--is not derived from the donee-
lessor's property, it cannot constitute an equity in the lessor's
property.14 7
In sum, the donor's retention of a reversionary interest
should not preclude the donor from deducting rent in the gift-
leaseback situation. The reversionary interest should not be
treated as a disqualifying retention of control, if it does not take
effect for at least ten years. Any other result conflicts with the
congressional determination made in the grantor trust rules to
treat ten-year trusts as viable entities for federal income tax
purposes. For the same reason, the grantor's retention of a re-
versionary interest in the trust property that satisfies the re-
uity interest in a gift-leaseback transaction in which donor's professional corpo-
ration leased the property from the donee trust and the donor retained a
reversionary interest in the property), acq. in result 1984-17 I.R.B. 5.
One commentator posited and then rejected the argument that the grantor
should be allowed a rental deduction only to the extent that the rental pay-
ments exceed the increased value of the reversionary interest. See Oliver,
supra note 6, at 37-39. Professor Oliver correctly points out that such an ap-
proach to measuring the deductible rental in a gift-leaseback transaction would
undermine § 673 and the entire present statutory treatment of ten-year trusts.
Id. at 39.
146. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
147. Cf. Mathews, 61 T.C. at 22 ("equity" in "property" for purposes of
§ 162(a) (3) means an interest taken from the lessor or "at least overlapping a
purported ownership interest of the lessor"). But cf. Cochran, Gift-Leaseback
Rental Deductions: A Critical Review of Three Decades of Litigation, 6 REv.
TAx'N INDrv. 307, 313 (1982) (concluding that it is logically possible for a donor-
lessee to give up enough control to shift the income to the trust and its benefi-
ciaries under §§ 671-679 and still hold an equity for purposes of § 162(a) (3)).
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quirements of section 673 should not serve as a disqualifying
equity interest under section 162(a) (3). In the context of a gift-
leaseback transaction, the term "equity" should include only
the donor-lessee's retention of an ownership interest in the
term of years that is the subject of the leaseback transaction.
b. Prearrangement of the Leaseback
The issue of whether the leaseback of the property was
prearranged prior to the gift transfer has arisen in gift-lease-
back jurisprudence in a number of different ways. First, the
prearranged nature of the leaseback was an important element
in the Tax Court's initially hostile reaction to the gift-leaseback
transaction 48 and in the government's development of the
business-purpose 49  and economic-reality' 5 0  arguments
adopted by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits and followed by the
Tax Court in cases appealable to those circuits.151 The focus
here, however, is the uncertain role of the donor's prearrange-
ment of the leaseback in determining the validity of the gift-
leaseback transaction in those jurisdictions that purport to fol-
low the bifurcated transaction approach to analyzing the gift-
leaseback arrangement.
The early courts of appeals decisions of Skemp152 and
Broun'l ignored the prearrangement of the leaseback and up-
held the taxpayers' deduction of the rental payments. Several
recent Tax Court cases have followed this view of prearrange-
ment in upholding the rental deductions in gift-leaseback trans-
actions. 5 4 In other cases, however, the Tax Court and the
courts of appeals have sustained the taxpayer's deduction of
the rentals on the leaseback but emphasized that the trustees
had actively negotiated the leaseback with the grantor after the
gift transfer,5 5 or, if the initial leaseback was prearranged, em-
phasized that it did not cover the entire term of the trust, so
148. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 68-87 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
151. See authorities cited supra note 14.
152. Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
153. Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814
(1950).
154. See Rosenfeld, 43 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) at 1357; May, 76 T.C. at 11;
see also Lerner, 71 T.C. at 293. For an earlier Tax Court decision upholding the
rental deductions in a gift-leaseback transaction despite the donor's implicitly
prearranged leaseback for the duration of the trust, see Oakes, 44 T.C. at 527-28.
155. See Serbousek v. Commissioner, 36 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 479, 483
(1977) (emphasizing that the trustee had "the right and opportunity to negoti-
ate regarding the leaseback").
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that the trustee had an opportunity to actively negotiate the re-
newals of the leaseback.156 The uneasy implication in such
cases is that a leaseback prearranged by the donor prior to the
gift transfer, particularly if it covers the entire term of the trust,
may be treated as indicative of the donor's retained control
over or equity interest in the trust property, even in those juris-
dictions that reject the government's business-purpose test and
purport to treat the gift and leaseback as a bifurcated
transaction.
This emphasis on prearrangement evidences a misunder-
standing by the courts of the nature of the inquiry required in
analyzing the gift-leaseback transaction. The focus of the
court's analysis should be on the donor's use of the leased
property after the gift and whether that use is consistent with
the donor's purported change in status from owner of the prop-
erty to mere user for value as lessee. The court should scruti-
nize carefully the leaseback transaction to ensure that the
donor-lessee's use of the property is conditioned on the pay-
ment of a reasonable rent and that the other terms of the lease-
back likewise reflect a bona fide lease arrangement between
the donor and the trust. If the leaseback satisfies these re-
quirements, it should be irrelevant whether it was prearranged
or covers the entire duration of the trust. The donor's legal and
economic position with respect to the property have changed
sufficiently to justify recognition of the leaseback as a bona fide
transaction.
If, prior to the gift, the grantor arranged to lease the prop-
erty at a fair rental to a third party for the duration of the trust
and then made the gift, the gift unquestionably would shift tax-
ation of the rental income to the donee-trust for the term of the
trust. The result should not change merely because the prear-
ranged bona fide rental arrangement is with the donor. The
economic effect to the trust and its beneficiaries is the same in
both cases-receipt of fair compensation from a tenant in re-
turn for the tenant's use of the trust's property. The courts
have not identified any sound policy reason for ascribing differ-
156. See Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d at 1281-82 (emphasizing the one-year term of
the amended leaseback in sustaining the gift-leaseback); Quinlivan, 37 TAx CT.
MEM. DEC. (CCH) at 348 (emphasizing the corporate trustee's opportunity to
negotiate one-year renewals of the leaseback in upholding the validity of the
gift-leaseback transaction); cf. Brooke, 468 F.2d at 1157 (absence of fixed term
for the leaseback helped establish that the donor relinquished control over the
trust property).
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ent tax consequences to these two economically-equivalent
transactions.
Further, emphasizing prearrangement exalts form over
substance, as virtually every leaseback is at least implicitly pre-
arranged prior to the gift.157 Thus, if the requirement that the
leaseback not be prearranged were applied strictly, almost
every gift-leaseback transaction would fail under the Mathews
criteria. Moreover, even if the leaseback is not prearranged,
the donor is certain to be the highest bidder for the property,
since the donor has both a preexisting use that makes the prop-
erty more valuable to the donor than to a third party and an in-
centive to pay as much rent as reasonably possible to deflect a
greater amount of income to the donee-trust.158 Accordingly,
there is no sound reason to make the trustee go through the
motions of negotiating the leaseback after the gift, and the do-
nor's prearrangement of the leaseback should be ignored by
the courts in deciding the validity of the transaction.
c. Trustee Independence
The requirement of an independent trustee has been a ma-
jor source of confusion and controversy in gift-leaseback juris-
prudence. Although most decisions sustaining the donor's
deduction of the rentals have treated the independent trustee
requirement as a pivotal factor in establishing that the donor
has relinquished control over the leased property,159 the courts
have neither developed a convincing rationale for requiring any
special measure of independence on the part of the trustee in a
gift-leaseback transaction nor agreed on a test to decide
whether the trustee is in fact independent. Courts largely have
misapplied the independent trustee requirement and, thus,
needlessly complicated the analysis of the gift-leaseback
transaction.
The varied and conflicting tests used by the courts in deter-
mining whether a trustee is independent best illustrate the fu-
tility of using the independent trustee requirement as a basis
for deciding the validity of a gift-leaseback transaction. For ex-
ample, many cases focus on the trustee's identity and relation-
ship to the grantor apart from the'gift-leaseback transaction,
often with little or no analysis of whether the trustee actually
acted independently of the grantor in managing the leased
157. See Rosenfeld, 43 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) at 1357.
158. See supra note 115.
159. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d at 1281.
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property. Under this view, the grantor serving as sole trustee
generally has been fatal.160 Yet, in one notable decision, Brooke
v. United States,161 the Ninth Circuit found the grantor to be an
independent trustee because the property was managed under
a court-supervised guardianship arrangement which the court
treated as a trust.162 Trustees with a familial relationship to
the grantor generally have been treated as lacking indepen-
dence, 63 presumably because courts assume that such trustees
will follow the donor's wishes rather than exercise their own in-
dependent judgment in managing the leased property; yet pro-
fessionals like the grantor's attorney or accountant have
generally been treated as independent trustees, with little anal-
ysis of the nature of their relationship to the grantor or the ac-
tual independence of their actions.164
The very prototype of the independent trustee-the corpo-
rate trustee with which the donor has no relationship as either
an officer, director, or stockholder-has been treated as in-
160. See, e.g., Van Zandt, 341 F.2d at 443 (donor-lessee served as sole
trustee and retained a reversionary interest in the trust property; disallowing
rental deductions because the transaction, viewed as an integrated whole,
lacked a business purpose); Wiles v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 289, 298 (1972) (do-
nor-lessee served as sole trustee; rental deduction disallowed), affd mer., 491
F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974); Penn v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 144, 153-54 (1968)
(same); cf. Audano, 428 F.2d at 258 (grantor-physician appointed himself as co-
trustee with his attorney; rental deduction disallowed). But cf. May, 76 T.C. at
15 (grantor appointed himself as co-trustee with his friend; majority treated
grantor's friend as an independent trustee and upheld rental deduction).
161. 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972).
162. Id. at 1157-58.
163. See Chace v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 513, 515-16 (M.D. Fla. 1969)
(grantor's wife and brother-in-law served as co-trustees; rental deduction disal-
lowed), affid per curiam, 422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970); Furman v. Commissioner,
45 T.C. 360, 364 (1966) (grantor's wife served as sole trustee; rental deductions
disallowed), affid per curiam, 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967). But cf. Potter v. Com-
missioner, 27 T.C. 200, 213 (1956) (grantor's father, wife, and accountant served
as co-trustees; validity of gift-leaseback arrangement sustained), acq. 1957-2
C.B. 6.
164. See Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d at 1281 (grantor's accountant and attorney
treated as independent trustees; grantor's daughter, a beneficiary of the trust,
later appointed as a co-trustee, a fact ignored in the majority opinion); Broum,
180 F.2d at 929 (grantor's attorney treated as independent trustee); Lerner, 71
T.C. at 302 (grantor's attorney served as sole trustee; court had "trouble in de-
ciding whether the trustee in fact acted independently" of the taxpayer, but ul-
timately concluded that the trustee was sufficiently independent because he
refused some of the taxpayer's requests to purchase additional equipment with
trust funds). But see Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d at 1287 (MacMahon, J., dissenting)
(questioning the actual independence of the trustees); Mathews, 520 F.2d at 324
(grantor's attorney not treated as independent trustee because of prearranged
nature of the leaseback covering the entire period of the trust; transaction
lacked "economic reality").
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dependent in the context of a gift-leaseback transaction, 65 but
even here there are exceptions based on the supposedly illu-
sory nature of the trustee's independence as a result of the pre-
arranged leaseback. 6 6 In other cases, however, the
prearranged nature of the leaseback was ignored, and the court
resolved the independent trustee issue by focusing on the
trustee's identity and relationship to the grantor.
67
Another factor some courts have used in deciding the
trustee's independence is the extent of the powers retained by
the donor-lessee over the trust property. Thus, rental deduc-
tions have been disallowed when the donor reserved either the
right to settle the trust accounts168 or to disapprove any sale of
the property by the trust. 6 9 In this context, the independent
trustee requirement seems nothing more than a reiteration of
the message that the donor-lessee must surrender control over
the property and not retain any nonfiduciary powers over the
leased property inconsistent with the donor's status as lessee.
Thus, the prior case law hardly provides strong support for a
separate requirement that the trustee possess some special de-
gree of independence from the donor and instead suggests that
the required independence of the trustee is more a matter of
form than substance.
The five opinions issued by the Tax Court in May v. Com-
missioner7 0 starkly illustrate the confusion that exists with re-
165. See Quinlivan, 599 F.2d at 272 (bank trustee); Skemp, 168 F.2d at 599-
600 (same); Duffy v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 4, 8 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (same),
rev'd on other grounds, 487 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938
(1974); Serbousek v. Commissioner, 36 TAx CT. MEB.. DEC. (CCH) 479, 483
(1977) (same); Oakes, 44 T.C. at 529-30 (same); Felix v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.
794, 804 (1954) (corporate trustee), nonacq. 1956-2 C.B. 10.
166. See Perry, 520 F.2d at 238 (bank trustee's independence illusory be-
cause of limitations placed on its powers by the prearranged leaseback of the
entire property for the duration of the lease); Butler v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.
327, 329-32 (1975) (even though bank served as trustee, the grantor retained
control over the trust property through a prearranged leaseback, following inte-
grated transaction business-purpose rule of the Fifth Circuit and disallowing
the rental deductions); cf. Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584, 588 (N.D.N.Y.
1962) (independent corporate trustee; rental deductions disallowed).
167. See supra notes 152-54.
168. Hall 208 F. Supp at 588. But see Oakes, 44 T.C. at 531-32 (grantor's re-
tention of the power to settle the accounts not fatal to the rental deductions on
the leaseback, since trustee had option to have account settled by a court).
169. See Furman v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 360, 364-65 (1966), afOld per
curiam, 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967); see also Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d at 1287 (MacMa-
hon, J., dissenting) (donor-lessee's right to construct additions to the property
at his own expense and to determine whether the trustees would improve the
unfinished portion of the property treated as indicia of the donor's retained
control over the trust property).
170. 76 T.C. 7 (1981), af'd, 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984).
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spect to the independent trustee requirement. In May, a
physician and his wife transferred real property used in the
physician's medical practice to an irrevocable trust for the ben-
efit of their children, although the deed transferring the prop-
erty to the trust was not recorded for two and one-half years
after the trust's creation. The Mays retained no reversionary
interest and appointed Dr. May and his friend Mr. Gross as co-
trustees. On the same day that the trust instrument was exe-
cuted, May leased back the property for use in his medical
practice, but never signed the prepared written lease. Gross
simply assumed, without conducting any investigation, that the
lease was executed. Gross also never investigated whether ti-
tle to the property was properly transferred to the trust, al-
though he testified that he examined the trust's checkbook
about four times a year to ascertain that the rent had been
paid. Despite the personal relationship between Gross and
May and Gross's rather casual attitude toward his trust duties,
the Tax Court majority upheld the taxpayers' rental deduction.
The majority determined that Gross was sufficiently independ-
ent to satisfy the independent trustee requirement, but then re-
fused to decide whether an independent trustee is necessary in
every case to establish the validity of the gift-leaseback
transaction.171
Judge Goffe, in his concurring opinion, agreed that Gross
was sufficiently independent to satisfy the requirement, but de-
cided that an independent trustee was not necessary in this
case because the government had conceded that the rent was
reasonable17 2 and the grantor had not retained a reversionary
interest. Yet, Judge Goffe did not define what degree of inde-
pendence would be required in a case in which the grantor had
retained a reversionary interest in the trust property.
The three dissenting opinions agreed that the appointment
of an independent trustee was essential in gift-leaseback cases
to establish that the grantor had relinquished control over the
trust property under the Mathews criteria. The three dissent-
ing opinions also agreed that Gross did not satisfy the in-
dependent trustee requirement. Nonetheless, the dissenting
opinions failed to provide any concrete guidelines for determin-
ing whether a trustee is in fact independent, except to suggest
that the grantor cannot be trustee.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's deci-
171. Id. at 14-15.
172. Id. at 32 (Goffe, J., concurring).
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sion and sustained the taxpayer's deduction of the rentals on
the leaseback, basing its decision on the criteria enunciated in
its earlier decision in Brooke,173 including the independence of
the trustee.1 74 The court upheld the Tax Court's finding that
Gross was independent with little discussion of the issue.1 75
Consequently, although the Ninth Circuit implied that an in-
dependent trustee is necessary in establishing the validity of
the gift-leaseback transaction, it provided no guidance as to
how to determine independence or lack thereof.
All of this demonstrates the folly of attempting to formu-
late an extra-statutory test requiring an independent trustee in
every gift-leaseback transaction. The courts cannot agree on
whether such a requirement is even necessary, let alone pro-
vide a reasonably precise definition of the nature and degree of
required independence. The confusion in the case law over
this concept confirms the inappropriateness of using this factor
as a basis for resolving the gift-leaseback controversy.
In addition, the courts and commentators advocating the
independent trustee requirement have not explained ade-
quately why the trustee in a gift-leaseback transaction should
possess any greater degree of independence than required by
the grantor trust rules. Since the grantor trust rules permit the
grantor to serve as trustee without being taxed on the trust in-
come, provided that those rules are otherwise satisfied,176 why
use a different approach in the gift-leaseback area? One sus-
pects that proponents of the requirement believe the independ-
ent trustee can help assure that the donor-lessee pays a
reasonable rent for the continued use of the property, as sug-
173. 468 F.2d at 1157.
174. May, 723 F.2d at 1436.
175. Id. at 1437.
176. The grantor trust rules distinguish somewhat different types of trust-
ees. Under those rules, if the trustee is the grantor himself or a "related or
subordinate party" (defined by I.R.C. § 672(c) (1982) as certain specified rela-
tives of the grantor or an employee of the grantor, who are presumed sub-
servient to the grantor unless the contrary is shown by a preponderance of the
evidence), the powers that may be given to the trustee without causing the
grantor to be taxed on the trust income are more limited in nature than those
that may be given to a trustee who is an adverse party. See I.R.C. §§ 674, 675,
677 (1982). If the trustee is an "adverse party" (defined by LRC. § 672(a) (1982)
as a person having a substantial beneficial interest in the trust, whose interest
would be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of the powers in
question), his or her powers are not imputed to the grantor and hence will not
cause the grantor to be taxed on the income from the trust under the grantor
trust rules. See LR.C. §§ 674-677 (1982). See generally 3 B. BrrKER, supra note
21, ch. 80 (1981).
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gested by Judge Goffe in his concurring opinion in May.177
This argument has some validity if the donor-lessee attempts to
pay too low a rent since the independent trustee has a fiduciary
duty to exact at least fair rental value. As previously noted,
however, it is unlikely that the donor-lessee will pay too low a
rental.1 7 8 The more likely scenario is that the grantor will at-
tempt to assign a greater amount of income by paying more
than the fair rental value of the property, and thus it is difficult
to see what function an independent trustee is expected to
serve. If the grantor offers more than the fair rental value of
the property, there would be no reason for even an independ-
ent trustee to refuse the payment, because it is the trustee's
duty to exact the highest rent possible for the property. 7 9
The stronger argument for requiring an independent
trustee is that the grantor trust rules do not address certain po-
tential abuses in the gift-leaseback setting. The grantor trust
rules focus on powers the grantor retains over the trust prop-
erty in the trust instrument that are inconsistent with the gran-
tor's claim of transferred ownership. Although that potential
abuse is present in the gift-leaseback transaction as well and
can be remedied by applying the grantor trust rules, there is
also the poorly articulated concern that the donor will use the
relationship as lessee to retain controls over the trust property
that under the grantor trust rules could not be retained directly
through the trust instrument. The independent trustee thus
can provide additional assurance that the donor-lessee will pay
rent and otherwise respect the terms of the leasehold relation-
ship. Arguably, since the leasehold relationship and the conse-
quent change in the donor's economic position are all that
separate the donor from the same control after as before the
gift, and since the grantor trust rules do not focus on this lease-
hold relationship, an independent trustee is indispensable to
establishing the validity of the gift-leaseback transaction.18 0
177. 76 T.C. at 32-33 (Goffe, J., concurring).
178. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
179. See Friedlander, supra note 23, at 304 n.74 (positing that the trustee
might violate his or her fiduciary duty in refusing such rental).
180. It could be argued that the leaseback of the trust property to the donor
is analogous to a loan of trust corpus to the donor. Under LI.C. § 675(3) (1982),
the donor is taxed on the income from the loaned portion of the trust corpus,
unless the loan provides for adequate interest and security and is made by a
trustee other than the grantor or a related or subordinate trustee. Under this
theory, an independent trustee would be necessary in the gift-leaseback trans-
action to avoid taxation of the donor on the income from the trust. See Cohen,
supra note 4, at 41. No court has yet mentioned this argument as a basis for
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This argument, however, ignores that the trust owns the
property after the gift. The trustee, whether the grantor or a
third party, has a fiduciary obligation to manage the property
competently for the beneficiaries,181 with the potential for judi-
cial supervision of the trust should the trustee abuse those
powers. The fiduciary duties imposed by state law and the
trust instrument, plus the restrictions imposed on the trustee's
powers under the grantor trust rules, should ensure that the
trustee manages the property in the beneficiary's best inter-
ests. Of course, if the grantor, either as trustee or through a
subservient trustee, does exercise control over the property in
contravention of the trust instrument, the trustee's fiduciary
obligations, or the limitations imposed by the grantor trust
rules, the court can disregard the trust as an economic nullity
or sham and disallow the grantor's rental deductions on the
leaseback.
Finally, the independent trustee requirement in the gift-
leaseback area is inconsistent with the approach taken in other
areas where the courts have refused, absent a great likelihood
of abuse, to premise a rule of tax law on the assumed abuse of
a trustee's fiduciary duties. For example, in the area of assign-
ments of income effected through a family partnership, the reg-
ulations and case authorities recognize that a donor can create
a valid family partnership arrangement by contributing the
partnership interest to a trust for the benefit of the donee, even
if the donor serves as trustee.182 In a different context, the Tax
requiring an independent trustee in the gift-leaseback situation and it appears
a rather strained reading of the statutory language.
181. See generally 2 A. ScoT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 169-185 (3d ed. 1967);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 169-185 (1959).
182. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (vii) (1956). These regulations contem-
plate the possibility that the donor will contribute the family partnership inter-
est to a trust for the benefit of family members and serve as trustee, stating.
[I]f the grantor is the trustee, or if the trustee is amenable to the will
of the grantor, the provisions of the trust instrument (particularly as to
whether the trustee is subject to the responsibilities of a fiduciary), the
provisions of the partnership agreement, and the conduct of the parties
must all be taken into account in determining whether the trustee in a
fiduciary capacity has become the real owner of the partnership inter-
est. Where the grantor (or person amenable to his will) is the trustee,
the trust may be recognized as a partner only if the grantor (or such
other person) in his participation in the affairs of the partnership ac-
tively represents and protects the interests of the beneficiaries in ac-
cordance with the obligations of a fiduciary and does not subordinate
such interests to the interests of the grantor.
Id.; see 1 W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WETrMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PART-
NERSHIS AND PARTNERS % 14.04[11 (1977) (citing authorities); see also HR. REP.
No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 33, reprinted in 1951 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1781, 1815; S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 40, reprinted in 1951 U.S. CODE
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Court recognized the validity of an installment sale made to a
trust for the benefit of the seller's minor children, with the
seller serving as trustee, stating:
Considering our holdings in a number of other cases, we conclude
that the fact that a seller of property is the trustee of the trusts to
which the property is sold, standing alone, does not cause the sale to
lack substance or bona fides, or the seller to constructively receive the
income from the sale received by the trusts. The crucial fact is
whether the trustee was acting solely as trustee and in the best inter-
ests of the trusts in making the purchase and sale of the property.183
Likewise, the real issue in the gift-leaseback transaction is not
the trustee's identity, but whether that trustee manages the
property in accordance with his or her fiduciary obligations and
the limitations imposed by the grantor trust rules. 8 4
In sum, the independent trustee requirement unnecessa-
rily complicates gift-leaseback jurisprudence. The premise that
the grantor, or someone close to the grantor, cannot serve as
trustee in a gift-leaseback transaction is inconsistent with the
judgment made in formulating the grantor trust rules and other
tax laws that the limitations imposed on the trustee by state fi-
duciary law, the trust instrument, and the grantor trust rules
sufficiently ensure that the trust property is managed for the
benefit of the beneficiaries. Instead of focusing on the trustee's
identity, the court should examine the trustee's actions during
the term of the trust and determine whether the property is be-
ing managed in the interest of the beneficiaries. If the trustee
has properly discharged all fiduciary duties, then the courts
should respect the gift-leaseback arrangement regardless of the
trustee's identity. To be sure, the actions and dealings of the
donor or a close relative serving as trustee will require more
careful scrutiny; thus, the prudent grantor who wants to reduce
uncertainty as to whether the transaction will be considered
CONG. & AD. NEws 1969, 2009; cf. 3 A. WILLIs, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAnm,
PARTNERs=P TAXATION § 172.08, at 172-15 (3d ed. 1981) (recognizing that the
grantor can serve as trustee but warning that "there are acute problems if the
grantor is the trustee").
183. Goodman v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 684, 708-09 (1980), nonacq. 1981-1
C.B. 2, affid mer., 673 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1981); cf. Vaughn v. Commissioner, 81
T.C. 893 (1983). But see Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 593, 598 (5th Cir.
1971) (indicating that an independent trustee is necessary in the context of an
installment sale of stock to a family trust if the seller is to avoid constructive
receipt of liquidation proceeds received by the trust from the corporation).
These cases arose prior to the revision of the installment sale provisions to per-
mit the use of § 453 in connection with a § 337 liquidatioii. See LR.C. § 453(h)
(1982).
184. For other critiques of the independent trustee requirement in the gift-
leaseback area, see Friedlander, mupra note 23, at 300-01; Froehlich, supra note
23, at 971; Albany Note, supra note 23, at 589-90.
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bona fide will appoint an independent party as trustee. But if
the donor or someone close to the donor does serve as trustee
and proceeds to manage the property in accordance with all fi-
duciary obligations, there is simply no good reason to disregard
the gift-leaseback arrangement.
Il1L SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR ANALYZING THE
GIFT-LEASEBACK TRANSACTION
As this Article indicates, the gift-leaseback transaction
properly should be viewed as a device by which a high-bracket
donor attempts to assign income from property to a lower-
bracket donee through the use of a trust. The standards used
in analyzing the gift-leaseback transaction should be consistent
with the rules developed under the case law for assignments of
income from property and with the grantor trust rules of the
Code. The Tax Court's four-part test in Mathews represents
just such a workable approach. Although courts have encoun-
tered difficulties in applying the Mathews criteria, these diffi-
culties are largely a result of the courts' inconsistent and
illogical interpretations of those requirements rather than any
inherent problems in the test itself.
First, the majority approach of analyzing the gift and lease-
back portions of the transaction separately and applying the
business-purpose standard only to the leaseback portion repre-
sents a logical application of the statutory requirements of sec-
tion 162(a) (3). That section focuses only on the donor-lessee's
use of the property during the term of the lease, and if the
property is used in the donor's business, the business-necessity
requirement of section 162(a) (3) is satisfied. Courts should
continue to reject the government's integrated transaction busi-
ness-purpose test, which requires a business purpose for the
donor's gift transfer to the trust, as it has little support in logic,
the case law, or the policies underlying the assignment-of-in-
come doctrine and the grantor trust rules.
Second, the Mathews requirements that the lease normally
be in writing and create a binding obligation on the part of the
donor-lessee to pay a reasonable rental are crucial in determin-
ing whether the leaseback transaction has substance. The ab-
sence of either of these indicia of a bona fide rental
arrangement strongly suggests that the donor has retained use
of the property in a capacity other than as a fiduciary or tenant
and that the donor should be treated as retaining ownership of
the property for purposes of section 162(a) (3).
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Third, the disqualifying equity requirement of the Mathews
test is taken directly from the statute and requires nothing
more than that the donor-lessee no longer own the property in-
terest that he or she purports to rent, that the term of years
covered by the leaseback be specified, and that the rent pay-
ments compensate the trust for temporary use of that property
interest. If the donor retains a reversionary interest in the
trust property, it should not serve as a disqualifying equity in-
terest provided it satisfies the requirements of section 673 of
the Code.
Finally, under Mathews the donor must surrender suffi-
cient control over the property to warrant treating the trust as
the owner of the property for purposes of section 162(a) (3).
That section requires: (1) a valid and complete transfer of the
property in trust for at least the period required by section 673
of the Code; (2) design of the trust to comply with all of the re-
quirements of sections 674 through 679 of the Code; (3) the exe-
cution of a binding lease agreement that limits the donor's
nonfiduciary use of the property to uses consistent with lessee
status; and (4) actual management of the property by the
trustee, whether that trustee is the donor or some third party,
in a manner consistent with the limitations imposed upon the
trustee's powers by the grantor trust rules, the trust instru-
ment, and fiduciary obligations to manage the property for the
benefit of the trust beneficiaries. Other factors, such as the du-
ration of the leaseback, its prearranged nature, or any special
measure of trustee independence, are extraneous considera-
tions, that cannot help to achieve a satisfactory resolution of
the gift-leaseback controversy.
IV. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
This Article has focused primarily on critically analyzing
the courts' approaches to handling the gift-leaseback issue and
using this analysis to develop a sensible analytic approach to
the problem. Because courts have not yet adopted the ap-
proach this Article suggests, however, it is appropriate to con-
clude with a set of planning recommendations to aid those tax
advisers who currently wish to design gift-leaseback transac-
tions for their clients.
First, the donor-lessee should transfer the property to an
irrevocable trust for the benefit of the donees, rather than di-
rectly to the donees, since gift-leasebacks involving direct
transfers to donees generally have not fared well in the
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courts.185 All steps necessary to effect a valid transfer of the
property to the trust under state law should be undertaken
carefully prior to executing the leaseback because an incom-
plete transfer of the property to the trust will invalidate the
gift-leaseback arrangement.186 In addition, at a minimum, the
trust must comply with all of the requirements of the grantor
trust rules embodied in sections 673 through 679 of the Internal
Revenue Code so that the donor-lessee will not be treated as
the owner of the trust property.
Second, to qualify for a rental deduction under section
162(a) (3) of the Code, the property leased by the donor-lessee
must be necessary to the conduct of the donor-lessee's trade or
business. Furthermore, in those circuits adopting the govern-
ments' integrated transaction business-purpose test (the
Fourth, Fifth, and, presumably, Eleventh Circuits), or in the
circuits which have not yet clearly expressed their views on
that test (the First, Sixth, Tenth, District of Columbia, and Fed-
eral Circuits), one should document significant nontax reasons
for transferring the property to the trust, such as insulating the
property from the donor's creditors or assuring proper manage-
ment of the property by a competent professional trustee for
the benefit of the trust beneficiaries. It is unlikely, however,
that the Fourth or Fifth Circuits would accept such nontax pur-
poses as satisfying the integrated transaction business-purpose
test, although the Fourth Circuit in Perry did seem to keep the
door ajar for such an argument.187
In addition, if at all possible, the donor-lessee should lease
only a portion of the transferred property and allow the trust to
lease the remaining portion of the property to third parties.
The Fifth Circuit in Van Zandt88 and the Fourth Circuit in
Perry'89 intimated that this factor might help the donor-lessee
establish a business purpose for the transfer of the property to
185. See supra note 4.
186. In seeking to disallow the deduction of the rentals in a gift-leaseback
transaction, the government sometimes has made the alternative argument
that the transfer of the property to the trust was invalid under state law and,
therefore, the donor-lessee remained the legal owner of the property. See May,
76 T.C. at 15 (deed transferring title of the property to the trust not executed
until two-and-one-half years after the date the instrument creating the trust
and the leaseback agreement were executed; holding that the property had
been validly transferred to the trust under state law on the date of execution of
the trust instrument).
187. See supra note 87.
188. 341 F.2d at 442. See also Butler v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 327, 332 (1975).
189. 520 F.2d at 239.
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the trust, namely, assuring competent professional
management.
Although some decisions have correctly downplayed the
significance of prearrangement,190 as a planning matter it is
also best to avoid any formal prearrangement of the leaseback
and have the donor negotiate the leaseback with the trustee
only after transfer of the property to the trust. Since the donor
is likely to place a rental value on the property at the high end
of the reasonableness scale,19 1 there is little practical risk that
even an independent trustee will reject the donor's rental offer.
In addition, in deference to those courts that are concerned the
duration of the leaseback may evidence the donor's retained
control over the property, the initial term of the leaseback
should be for a one or two year period and in any event should
not be coextensive with the duration of trust.19 2 Admittedly,
this recommendation is more a matter of form than substance.
It is also necessary that the leaseback bear all the ear-
marks of a bona fide leasehold relationship. The lease should
be in writing and create a binding leasehold relationship be-
tween the donee-trust and the donor-lessee, should contain
provisions concerning the rights and duties of parties that are
standard in a commercial lease, should not give the donor-
lessee any unusual rights or powers with respect to the leased
property, and should require the donor-lessee to pay rent for
the continued use of the property in a reasonable amount in
view of all the factors involved. The reasonableness of the
rental should be documented by an independent expert's ap-
praisal of the fair rental value of the property.193
It is unclear whether the donor can retain a reversionary
interest in the leased property without being treated as pos-
sessing a disqualifying equity interest within the meaning of
section 162(a) (3). Only a few courts, including the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Quinlivan, have upheld the validity of gift-leasebacks
190. See, e.g., authorities cited supra notes 152-54.
191. See Froehlich, supra note 23, at 970 (donor "Will always be the highest
bidder for use of the property").
192. If the term of the leaseback is coextensive with the trust's duration, the
leaseback either should have a rent escalation clause that provides for an ad-
justment of the rent to reflect increases in the rental value of the property or
should provide for renegotiation of the rentals. Cf. Rosenfeld, 43 TAx CT. MEM.
DEc. (CCH) at 1357.
193. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d at 1279-80 (rental paid by the grantor-
lessee on the leaseback set by an independent expert's appraisal of the fair
rental value of the property government did not challenge the reasonableness
of the rental); Simmons, supra note 3, at 203.
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when the donor retained a reversionary interest.194 Other
courts have either failed to discuss the issue, used the grantor's
retention of a reversionary interest as a factor weighing against
the validity of the gift-leaseback transaction, or intimated that
the grantor's transfer of the reversionary interest helped estab-
lish relinquishment of control over the property.195 Accord-
ingly, as a planning matter it is best to place the remainder
interest in someone other than the donor, such as the donor's
spouse or other relative.196 Alternatively, a donor wishing to
retain a reversionary interest in the trust property can more
safely avoid the government's disqualifying equity argument by
transferring the property to the trust and setting up a corpora-
tion to lease the property from the trust along the lines sug-
gested by the Lerner case.197 To be successful, however, the
donor must respect all corporate formalities and document that
he or she has a principal purpose other than effecting the gift-
leaseback transaction for using the corporate form to conduct
business. 98 It is also important that the property be owned by
194. See cases cited supra note 145.
195. See cases cited supra notes 140-41.
196. Other income, estate, and gift tax considerations also militate against
using the Clifford trust to effect the gift-leaseback transaction. First, the in-
creased estate and gift tax costs of establishing a Clifford trust, resulting from
the unification of the estate and gift tax rate schedules in 1977, have reduced
the attractiveness of Clifford trusts as a planning device. See Adams & Herpe,
Clifford Trusts: Planning Opportunities under ERTA And Other Recent Devel-
opments, 121 TY. & EST. 44, 45-46 (1982); Fiore, Gift or Sales Coupled with
Leasebacks, 32 MAJTOR TAX PLAN. 1600, 1607.1, at 16-20 n.67, 1607.2, at 16-23
(1980). The attractiveness of the Clifford trust has been further undercut by
the Treasury's recent amendment of the gift tax regulations to use a 10% (as
opposed to the previous 6%) rate of return in measuring the value of the gift of
an income interest in property. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(f) (1984) (the new
regulations are generally effective for transfers occurring after November 30,
1983). Second, if the donor retains no reversionary interest in the trust prop-
erty, the transfer of the property to the donee-trust will shift any future appre-
ciation in the value of the property from the donor's estate to the trust
beneficiaries' estates. See Fiore, supra, 1607.1, at 16-19. Third, if the property
is expected to be sold at a time when its value is in excess of the donor's ad-
justed basis, income tax savings will be achieved if the property is sold by the
presumably lower-bracket trust or its beneficiaries rather than by the higher-
bracket donor. Id. But see LR.C. § 644 (1982) (if the property is sold by the
trust within two years after the donor gives it to the trust, all or a part of the
recognized gain on the sale may be taxable to the trust at the donor's income
tax rates).
197. Lerner v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 290 (1978), acq. in result 1984-17 LR.B.
5.
198. If the grantor's principal purpose for organizing the corporation is to
obtain the benefit of rental deductions on the leaseback in a situation where
the deductions would not have been available if the grantor had leased back
the property from the donee-trust, the government could argue that I.R.C. § 269
applies to disallow the corporation's rental deductions on the leaseback. It is
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the donor as an individual, rather than by the corporation, prior
to the gift transfer.19 9
Finally, although one can argue that no special degree of
trustee independence should be required in a gift-leaseback
transaction, prudent planning mandates the appointment of an
"independent" trustee rather than the donor or a member of
the donor's family. The safest course is to appoint a corporate
trustee with which the donor has no relationship as an officer,
director, or stockholder, although the donor's attorney or ac-
countant probably also will be treated as independent under
the case law. The trustee's powers over the trust corpus should
be broad enough to mute any argument that the trustee's inde-
pendence is illusory in nature.
These recommendations present an admittedly conserva-
tive approach to planning the gift-leaseback transaction. If all
of the above recommendations are followed, the taxpayer
should be successful in deducting the rentals on the leaseback
in the Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits and
should have a reasonable chance of prevailing in those circuits
that have not yet decided the gift-leaseback issue. Taxpayers
residing in the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, however,
have only faint hope of success on the gift-leaseback issue, un-
less the Supreme Court resolves the issue against the govern-
ment or the taxpayers are willing to litigate the issue in the
United States Claims Court2 00
unlikely, however, that the courts would adopt such a broad interpretation of
§ 269. Cf. Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981) (incorporation to obtain
congressionally sanctioned I.R.C. § 401 pension plan benefits not a I.L.C. § 269
tax-avoidance purpose); Achiro v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 881 (1981) (same).
These cases were decided prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 269A as part of the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 269A4, 96
Stat. 324, 528. For an extensive discussion of § 269, see B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 16.21 (4th
ed. 1979).
199. If property owned by a corporation is transferred to a trust for the ben-
efit of a shareholder's children or other relatives, the transfer will be treated as
a dividend in kind to the shareholder of the fair market value of the property.
See I.R.C. §§ 301, 316 (1982).
200. The United States Claims Court is bound only by the precedent of the
United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit regardless of where the taxpayer resides. See generally 4 B.
BITKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 115.7, at 115-41 to
-42 (1981) (discussion of the effect of precedent on choosing a forum in which to
litigate a tax controversy); M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
9.04[21, at 9-20 (1981) (same); Jones & Singer, Changes in Procedure, Strategy
Due in New Federal Circuit and Revamped Claims Court, 57 J. TAx'N 136
(1982).
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CONCLUSION
The transfer by a donor of business property to a trust, fol-
lowed by the donor's leasing back of the property for continued
business use, constitutes an assignment of income from the
property for the duration of the trust. The transaction should
be analyzed under standards consistent with the policies un-
derlying the assignment-of-income doctrine and its codification
in the trust area in the form of the grantor trust rules. Al-
though congressional action on the issue would help clarify the
matter, such action is unnecessary. The four-part test enunci-
ated by the Tax Court in Mathews and developed in subse-
quent cases, if interpreted in a consistent manner along the
lines suggested in this Article, is adequate to achieve the
proper results in the gift-leaseback cases. Since the courts in
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have refused to follow this ap-
proach to date and those courts that do follow the Mathews test
disagree about the precise nature of the Mathews require-
ments, review by the United States Supreme Court in the Ro-
senfeld or May cases is imperative if a sensible and reasonably
clear solution to the gift-leaseback controversy is to be
achieved.
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